


NEW TIMES

Count
Schulenburg's
warnings to
Stalin

February 26 – March 4, 1991

8

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A poor man's
political
games

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NO COMMENT



Leonid Tishkov

NATION

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES *Eduard Shevardnadze*


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A new association founded

p.4



How the fate of the Prague Spring was decided

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Cover by Victor Brel

From our mailbag

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■ In my opinion, today your magazine is slipping towards anti-perestroika positions, to almost malevolence in regard to CPSU leaders. As one reads articles by Tatiana Ivanova one asks: "Why are all of them permeated with venom and hatred of our party and our heroic past?" True, in the past we had some bad experience! But the smearing of the past will not fill shop counters. It goes against my grain when Ivanova calls the Communist Party of the Russian Federation the party of Polozkov. It is an offence to a multimillion army of Russian Communists who began perestroika and are now marching in its vanguard, with Polozkov being admitted by them to the party along with other people. He was elected at the congress to a position of leadership by Communist delegates with ample life experience. And you are trying to make fools out of them. I have never met Polozkov personally, but judging by his programme he looks like a true communist. Leaders come and go, and the Communist Party stays! We owe it to such

people like Polozkov, Nina Andreyeva and Egor Ligachev that today we live, plough the land and criticize, and that our land has been saved from the fascist plague. Saboteurs, the enemies of the people, are to blame for the lack of goods. In reality we have plenty of everything, but we, like beggars, go to the West, cap in hand: "Help us, for God's sake." Sin and shame on us Russians. This is what one should write about today. We only have to stir up people's patriotism and enthusiasm and we'll have an abundance of everything.

V. Kulnich,

war veteran and veteran of the
USSR armed forces,
Volgograd, USSR

■ Part three of the new wording of Article 10 of the USSR Constitution speaks about the ownership of land and other natural resources of the "peoples living on the given territory." But why the peoples, and not the population? The term "population" does not denote any national or racial distinctions. The word "peoples"

has quite a different meaning, one which emphasizes a historically formed stable group of people — a nationality, nation and ethnic origin. In my view, this article has become a breeding ground to nationalism and racism, which are founded on a sharp differentiation of the population by nationality. This has found its illustration in the appearance in a number of republics of laws legalizing racial discrimination by national and ethnic background. The given article makes outcasts of 75 million people, representatives of the "non-indigenous" nation. Yet all of them are citizens of the USSR and have the right to choose the place of their residence. Now they are trying to establish to what ethnic group the given territory belongs and who belongs to the various "foreign language groups." People become refugees and leave their homes just as during a fire. And indeed, our common home is on fire. The fire is flaring up and this article of the Constitution is pouring oil on the flames.

Vasily Drozhin,
LLB, Leningrad, USSR

Democrats, but not liberals

■ Not long ago I heard an acquaintance of mine utter a sly phrase to the effect that this country had witnessed not a victory of DEMOCRACY but a victory of DEMOCRATS. Democracy continues to be for us a pie in the sky. Having made a giant leap towards a better future we are once again back to square one.

In the last three years, the word "democrat" has acquired in the mass media, and especially in unofficial publications, an inaffable hue. About two years ago I happened to take part in a meeting of the Democratic Union. The crowd with patent unsocialist enthusiasm pelted militia cars with snowballs and milk containers. Later on, when the meeting was over, for the first time I heard this word in an unusual context: "Now the democrats have shown them!"

This is how I ceased to be a democrat.

Democracy has not always gone with liberalism, that is with the freedom of man and his inalienable rights. It is only after long and dramatic attempts that mankind has succeeded in coming up with a model of a **representative liberal democracy**, the results of which we can see in today's Western countries.

Democracy as an aspiration for ensuring the interests of "everyone" and liberalism as the freedom of "each person" are, in fact, two opposing elements that

representative democracy is called upon to unite. The organic combination of these two is possible only in a society that has developed a liberal consciousness and a socio-economic basis for liberalism: private enterprise and a wide class of owners, referred to as the middle class in the West.

Freedom is only possible when the category of freedom exceeds the bounds of mere legal definition and when a **philosophic concept of property is formulated** — when property includes not only real estate, but also labour force, man's free time, his life, intellect and talent.

In our situation — which might be called "democracy without a market" — people receive the formal opportunity to express their attitude towards the authorities, but at the same time there exist no differential economic interests that could fill elections, referendums or other democratic procedures with constructive content.

Thus in Russia the democratic movement has acquired a well-defined populist orientation (the Yeltsin phenomenon), whereas in other republics it is developing on the basis of nationalism which has resulted in the appearance of another strange term — the **"national democratic movement."** This term is currently used not only in relation to nationalism in the Baltics, where West Euro-

Either a disaster or a moratorium on political struggle

I have never met Polozkov, but he is a true communist

Is the Constitution pouring oil on the flames?

■ The section "From our mailbox" (No.47/90) featured a letter by a student from Minsk, N.Sukmanov, who proposes creating an extramural readers' Center for the Study of Political Life in Great Britain. I want to expand on this proposal. I think that it makes sense to set up the readers' club of "The Friends of *New Times*" in the framework of which we could create extramural groups for the study of many problems, and not only of those that pertain to Great Britain.

If you like my idea, I am ready to take part in carrying it out.

Andrei Romanov,
student, Moscow State
University
Moscow, USSR


■ I want to tell you about the plight of the Buryat people. The local authorities pretend that everything is O.K. But the Buryats have practically lost their language: only 4,000 people out of 250,000 have a subscription to the newspaper printed in their native language. If the policy of Russification continues, soon Buryat culture will disappear altogether. I have two children, and I cannot find either a kindergarten or a school where the Buryat language is taught. They say that it will require extensive funding, but over 100,000 residents of our city are Buryats.

I have decided to write about the existing situation to the UN Commission on Human Rights and ask them to examine the situation of our people and make their recommendations to the government of Russia and the sovereign Buryat Republic for the revival of Buryat culture. I think that all troubles are due to the fact that people have no say in choosing their own way of life and have no rights to own their native lands.

N. Manibadarov
Ulan-Ude, USSR

■ I have several remarks to make concerning the article by Leonid Mlechin "Germans Sheltering Jews?" (No.30/90).

The reasons for national



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

hatred always have a societal basis. Among these factors are a lack of education and the manipulation of consciousness

by those striving for power. I have never come across the situation in which an educated and socially protected man is a racist. But if a country is witnessing growing tension, people yearn to let off some steam.

Your author also has a perfunctory idea about people in the FRG getting rid of racist and nationalist myths. There are no Jewish pogroms, but desecration of Jewish cemeteries, monuments and synagogues continues. There is anti-Semitism in East Germany too. It is caused, first of all, by the lack of social protection faced by the citizens of the former GDR. People are looking for those who are weaker than they are to vent their irritation and disappointment.

It is very sad that Jews (and people of other nationalities) are emigrating from the Soviet Union. It is a shameful problem for the USSR, but you yourself should find a solution to it.

Hellmut Oelmann
Elbingerode,
Germany

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

pean mentality renders the nationalist movements a sufficiently civilized tinge, but also in relation to the nationalist movements in Azerbaijan and Central Asia where shots are being fired and people are being killed. People have ceased to differentiate between the notions of "democratic" and "opposition," and that cannot help but affect the authority of "democrats".

The time has come when I can say about myself: **I am not a democrat, I am a liberal.** The contraposition of these two categories that only yesterday was the prerogative of scientists, is becoming today the imperative of self-identification for intellectuals who are being guided by Western values.

Life itself has called into question first the idea of a parliamentary republic (and the corresponding slogan: "All power to the Soviets!") and then the related "republican" models of the transition period. The transition period has concretely required **strong central power.** The preservation of the single economic space has turned out to be inseparable from the preservation of the Union's integrity — regardless of the fact that the policy of Gorbachev aimed at the preservation of the Union is perceived as "dictates of the Centre" and "attempts to preserve the Empire."

"Politics or economics!" — that is the dilemma of

1991. Clumsy improvisation of political reform when one concept gave way to another (I single out three main stages: "party" model approved by the 19th party conference in 1988, the "Soviet" (parliamentary) model that was approved in 1989 and the "presidential" model of 1990) could not but bring about the crisis of power. In its turn the political crisis has called forth the economic crisis causing the disintegration of old economic ties while new ones have not yet been established. Mass politization of the population against the background of empty store shelves bodes no good. Under the conditions in which political rumblings directly affect the functioning of the economy, one should make a choice: either further escalation of political activity or a moratorium on political struggle and a stabilization.

This year we entered an epoch of authoritarian rule. One should not mourn over the crisis of democracy — a non-liberal, populist and nationalist democracy — the only kind of democracy which could have risen from the depths of a totalitarian society. I welcome that failure of democrats.


A failure of democrats, but not of the democracy.

Andrei Novikov,
political consultant with the Centre for the
Study of Public Movement.
Rybinsk, USSR

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

Eduard Shevardnadze:

“I’m not going to quit the political scene”



Eduard Shevardnadze has become president of the newly founded Foreign Policy Association. In his new capacity he granted an interview to *New Times* political analyst Galina SIDOROVA

was received by Eduard Shevardnadze in his new office in a small house on Yelizarova Street in Moscow. Despite the bare walls and modest furnishing of the room I had a feeling that our conversation had not broken off since our last meeting on December 29 on the seventh floor of the Foreign Ministry building on Smolenskaya Square. In the reception-room of the minister I noticed then a sheet of paper with his schedule. There were only dates on it – 29, 30, 31 December 1990 – and white emptiness.

A politician who suddenly found himself alone and enduring almost physical suffering because of this feeling. This is how Eduard Shevardnadze looked on that day.

In the detached house on Yelizarova Street I saw a man perhaps more absorbed in his thoughts and less inclined to smile, as he often did before. But the estrangement was overcome.

E. Shevardnadze The idea of founding a foreign policy association arose not because I do not want simply to remain a pensioner. This is not the main thing. I proceed from what I said at the congress of people’s deputies. The forces of the right – I called them reactionaries then – and some conservatives launched an attack on the principles of new political thinking, seeking a restoration of the old order. They present a real danger that can be felt at official forums, in newspaper articles and on television programmes. The threat from the right is increasing.

New Times. Can you name any concrete people?

E.Sh. At the congress I said that I would not name names and do not want to do that now. For this is not a matter simply of who makes himself heard more loudly.

N.T. Nevertheless, in what political spheres does the source of the threat lie?

E.Sh. For this purpose it is enough to read the documents of the recent plenum of the party’s central committee and other materials. I am very worried about the course of development. In this connection I believe that the main task of the association – and we are going to invite those who have similar views, people who can think creatively and analyze events – is to defend the achieve-

ments of perestroika, the principles of new political thinking and to carry them forward. Thanks to perestroika and democratization, striking changes have taken place in our country and the world, and we have no right to retreat. The activity of the association – research, lectures and discussions – will be subordinate to this basic aim. I even wanted to call it “New Thinking.”

N.T. Almost two months have passed since you stepped down. Do you feel that you are out of politics, as we usually understand the term?

E.Sh. No, I don't feel. Together with my long-time associates I take great interest in my new work. Of course, there is a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. We have not yet organized our work on a broad scale and are still experiencing growing pains. There are no results so far. But we have plenty of enthusiasm.

N.T. Judging by how you characterized the association, it is first of all a political organization – a forum from which to express your political beliefs.

E.Sh. It is an independent organization dealing with foreign policy, which in its turn cannot be divorced from domestic policy. It appears therefore that it is an essentially political organization. Research, the study of different questions, global problems, the interconnection between foreign and home affairs will constitute an important part of our work. It is about politics, of course.

N.T. So you remain a politician first of all.

E.Sh. When the President introduced the new minister to the Foreign Ministry building I also said a few words. I said that “I'm not going to quit the political scene.” This does not mean I shall hold an official post. I shall engage in politics within my independent association. We shall try to be a truly independent organization.

N.T. How do you understand the concept “independence” in this particular case?

E.Sh. I have in mind independence in defining the main trends, in the planning of our work, in our judgements, our financial independence and, of course, an unbiased analysis of the merits and flaws of various political decisions, an unbiased analysis based on competence, reliable information, and a high scientific level of research.

N.T. What are the main areas of activity of your association?

E.Sh. In discussing our research work I do not have in mind work of the kind done in institutes. The association can use the research conducted by scholars and institutes to draw general conclusions. It can invite specialists to make their contribution to its work, organize discussions and give recommendations on different aspects of foreign policy and separate problems.

N.T. It is a kind of creative political centre, then?



The headquarters of the Foreign Policy Association on Yelizarova Street in Moscow

E.Sh. Yes, I think it is. It is possible that we shall have our own financial base and shall be able to conclude agreements with scholars at home and abroad and, together with foreign colleagues, work out concrete solutions to problems which require efforts on the part of politicians and scholars. We are going to study the international experience of settling conflicts in different regions and countries, draw up appropriate recommendations or even take part in the solution of problems of deep concern to everyone. It is also possible that the association will act as a mediator and take part in actual settlements. I have in mind conflicts of an international and political character.

N.T. While foreign minister, did you feel the need for advice and opinion from other people, for an independent analysis of the kind your Foreign Policy Association is going to make?

E.Sh. There was such a need. It is in this connection that a scientific coordinating centre was set up at the ministry and conferences were organized. I think our association will be able

to take a more unbiased view of various problems.

N.T. You were in the civil service all your life. How do you feel as an independent politician?

E.Sh. It is difficult to say now. Some time will have to pass.

N.T. Aren't you afraid?

E.Sh. No, I'm not afraid. It is rather interesting to be in an unusual condition. While I was foreign minister I knew when my working day began and I had a busy schedule. I knew, for instance, that at eight o'clock in the morning I

had to receive a summary of world news. It took 30 to 40 minutes to read it. Then came reports, meetings, an examination of different issues. Everything was planned. I don't have all this now.

N.T. Do you want to have a busy schedule again?

E.Sh. I hope it will be a relatively easier schedule. Perhaps I shall have a schedule of a different kind – meetings and trips. It is the most essential component of the activity of our association. If we engage in purely scientific, research work, we shall be unable to understand what worries the people, the country and the world. We must meet people, take part in discussions and

keep abreast of events in order to feel the pulse of political life.

N.T. Does this mean that you are going to work at the junction, so to speak, there in the country and abroad? Do you have any ideas or proposals?

E.Sh. We have received many invitations to give lectures or take part in discussions. Many invitations have come from the United States. There are also invitations from Japan and European countries. Until now we did not give preference to anyone. It is necessary first to complete our organizational affairs, and then we shall carry our plans into practice. I repeat that trips, lectures and conferences are a component part of the mission of our association.

N.T. Thus, you are a free man now.

E.Sh. No, I answer for everything that has been done. A person cannot be free if he has a sense of responsibility. In view of obvious attempts to revise and reassess everything which has been achieved over the past five years, I am going to prove that they are groundless.

N.T. Thus, you are sticking to your guns.

E.Sh. Yes, together with my colleagues, we shall defend the policy we pursued before. Forms can be different – newspaper and magazine articles and participation in discussions. We shall also invite those who disagree with us. Earlier I invited some of my opponents from among members of the Soviet Parliament, but they did not accept. Perhaps we can attract them now.

N.T. Attacks on our foreign policy became especially noticeable during the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

E.Sh. I declare with all responsibility that from the very beginning of the Gulf crisis we have done everything reasonably, in a balanced way, with regard for the situation in the region and in our country, in the interests of our people and in saving all of our citizens. This work was carried out efficiently and in keeping with the Security Council resolutions. In the Security Council we acted honestly and in a principled way. So our conscience is clear – before our people and the world. The course of operations for implementing the UN resolution by member countries of the coalition confirms that we adopted correct and timely measures.

N.T. What's in store? I have in mind another test of the strength of new thinking. Will it be ratification of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe?

E.Sh. Indeed, there is the danger that the treaty will not be concluded. I am sure that solutions must be found. Our partners lay some claims to us, and not without some grounds. If we fail to find a common language with them, the treaty will not be ratified by other parliaments. It makes no difference what country will not ratify the treaty. The point is that it will not be put into effect. This is bad. Such a failure will cancel out everything that was achieved in Helsinki, Vienna and Paris, and the Charter of Paris will become meaningless, for the treaty on conventional forces forms the basis of new relations between East and West.

N.T. I know that you have been visited by your former colleagues – foreign ministers of Japan, France and Kuwait. It seems to me for some reason that these were not simply courtesy calls.

E.Sh. It is usually called a courtesy call. But when politicians meet, they talk about politics. We discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf. At the meeting with Roland Dumas we also

talked about Soviet-French relations, the comprehensive treaty signed by the presidents of our two countries, recalled the difficulties which cropped up and how we managed to remove them. I had an emotional meeting with the Kuwaiti minister.

N.T. Did you feel any misgivings on their part about the development of events in the Soviet Union and how these events can affect its relations with other countries?

E.Sh. They have apprehensions and they do not conceal them. But they try to understand our concerns as well. It should be said frankly that it is not so simple now to preserve the good achievements of the past few years. But this must be done in the interests of our country and our partners. A great deal depends on us in this respect.

N.T. I understand that it is impossible to discuss all the questions. Nevertheless, what developments in our country worry you most of all?

E.Sh. I am worried most of all about the danger of the failure of perestroika. If perestroika fails, we shall be unable to feed the people, solve our social problems or settle our ethnic conflicts. The use of force will become inevitable.

N.T. What most endangers the achievements of perestroika?

E.Sh. The people are tired. Such a situation cannot last long. There is some limit. In these circumstances, some may decide that law and order can be ensured by a strong man. We know from our history the outcome of such a policy.

N.T. Perhaps we are trying to solve present-day problems from the wrong side.

E.Sh. It is difficult to say. The trouble is that problems have been accumulating for decades. In the past few years, too, we have not done everything as it should have been done. I am partly responsible for the mistakes because I was a member of the high echelons of power. It is on the one hand. On the other hand, old mistakes, old sins make themselves felt.

N.T. I think the enthusiasm of our present-day political leaders over perestroika has obviously cooled down.

E.Sh. I would not say so. They are looking for a way out. However, when problems are not solved or solved improperly, people become disappointed. This influences the sentiments

of the people and, of course, the leaders. It can be said that the leaders are now shrinking into themselves. However, they must act in the opposite way – to draw new people into the political process, to advance new ideas and boldly put them into practice. And, first of all, this must be done honestly. It is necessary to talk openly with the people.

* * *

My conversation with the president of the Foreign Policy Association began with internal affairs and returned to them.

Organizations like the newly founded one exist in many countries. They unite retired, eminent politicians of various political leanings, use their experience and prestige in their activity, conduct research, draw on brilliant minds and give recommendations to presidents and ministers. A person must have an appropriate service record or at least the recognized level of professionalism and the recommendations from several members of the association in order to become a member. Generally speaking, it is a sort of elite club of intellectuals in politics standing above politics, so to speak.

In our society, which has thrown off its ideological fetters but has not gotten rid of ideological intolerance, such a supra-political status is evidently inaccessible for the time being.

While Eduard Shevardnadze was foreign minister he felt what it means when the entire ministry becomes the target of attacks from the right with complete silence from the left. Balanced flanks are necessary at least so that government institutions can function properly and pursue a reasonable policy. In this respect the Foreign Policy Association might prove highly useful to the present Foreign Ministry.

I think the association will become a centre of brilliant minds from among democrats. Judging by an impressive list of its founding members, which includes research institutes specializing in international affairs, public movements, the Moscow Soviet, large export-oriented enterprises, newly founded organizations of entrepreneurs, and *New Times*, the Foreign Policy Association will be able to make a substantial contribution to the shaping of a democratic consensus on both foreign and domestic issues.

Photo by Eduard Pesov and Vladimir Galin



Who is instigating the conflict in Georgia?

The state of emergency is prolonged in Tskhinvali. How can the impasse be overcome?

Marina Shakina

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Chairman of the newly elected Supreme Soviet of Georgia, said in an interview with the *Irish Times* that the whole of Georgia was armed. In the Baltic republics, he noted, the population is unarmed, but all Georgians have arms. The events like in the Baltic republics, he warned, could lead to a war of the Afghan type or even to a more cruel war.

When the newly elected Georgian parliament, meeting for its first session, abolished the South Ossetian autonomous region, the experience of ethnic conflicts in the years of perestroika prompted that this decision would lead to bloody violence. And so it happened. It was reported the next day from Tskhinvali, capital of the autonomous region, that three persons had been killed and three more wounded.

"The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia," a statement issued by the press centre of the parliament said, "weighed all the pros and cons before taking such a

drastic step, because the matter at issue is the territorial integrity of the country whose people have fought for over 2,000 years to win independence and preserve their homeland." The members of the Georgian parliament seemed to well realize the implication of their decision.

Who provoked the conflict?

The abolition of the South Ossetian autonomous region was followed by a decree by President Gorbachev overruling the Georgian parliament's decision, a reply by Georgian leaders, who claim that it is an internal affair of the sovereign republic, the imposition of a state of emergency and a curfew, and the entry of public order forces. The state of emergency declared for a month has already been prolonged for two months.

For some time the events in Tskhinvali were virtually ignored by the media. National newspapers occasionally carried reports entitled: "The situation returns to normal." The attention of the public was riveted on events in the Baltic republics and

the Persian Gulf. However, by February the situation in Tskhinvali had become simply unbearable. There was no water, electricity, food or medicine, and armed clashes took place every day. The life of the city depends on the army, which has provided field bakeries and mobile power stations and escorts food supplies to the conflict zone. Boris Oleinik, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities (chamber) of the Soviet parliament, said on returning from Tskhinvali that having visited any areas of ethnic conflicts never saw anything of the kind.

Each step taken by Georgian and South Ossetian leaders seemed to be a reaction to the actions of the other side. The Georgian parliament abolished the South Ossetian autonomous region in retaliation for the declaration of the South Ossetian Soviet democratic republic as part of the USSR and the election of its own parliament. The proclamation of the republic is a reaction to the "anti-autonomy" campaign in Georgia and the latter's intention to secede from the USSR. At first, South Ossetia simply wanted to raise its status and become an autonomous republic within Georgia. The "anti-autonomy" campaign and the intention to secede from the USSR are a protest against "the unlawful establishment of the Ossetian autonomous region on primordial Georgian land in the early 1920s and against the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army."

We are witnessing one more lasting conflict with cheerless prospects for both sides driven to the dead end by the painstaking efforts of new politicians. The situation in Georgia is very reminiscent of that in Moldavia and the Baltic republics. There are distinctions, however. For instance, Georgia already had autonomies by the beginning of perestroika. In Moldavia, the Gagauz people and the population in the region east of the Dniester River only tried to set up autonomies. In the Baltic republics, there was only talk of establishing Russian-language autonomies (and Polish language autonomy in Lithuania). It will be recalled that blood was shed in the Abkhazian autonomous republic two years ago. The situation is not quiet in the Adzhar autonomous republic. Meskhetian Turks are now going to return to their Meskhetian region in Georgia. The Greeks living in Georgia are also demanding autonomy. In view of all this one can understand that the Georgian people are now living in a state of excitement, a sort of national combat alarm. "United and indivisible Georgia is first of all." This idea has eclipsed other ideals and aspirations and pushed urgent matters — democracy and human rights — into the background. "We shall deal with these matters after gaining independence and building a strong and stable state."

Tbilisi claims that Georgians are discriminated against in South Ossetia and that there are no territorial autonomies in other countries, and offers South Ossetia cultural autonomy. Tskhinvali presents facts testifying to the opposite. The exchange of such arguments is a road to nowhere.

Who are guests in Georgia?

Georgia is not going to sign a Union treaty while Ossetia wants to remain in the USSR. Georgian leaders think that Moscow is playing the Ossetian card in order to keep Georgia within the Union. The example of Moldavia looms large in their minds.

A method of opposing such course of events was chosen. The first blow was dealt at South Ossetia because it is the most vulnerable and "inconvenient" region. The Abkhazians are native inhabitants of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. Their right to autonomy was recognized even by the Georgian Republic, which existed from 1918 to 1921, and it is known that the present leaders of Georgia seek to restore the status it enjoyed in those years. The Adzhars are Georgians who profess Islam, and they enjoy autonomy on the basis of their religion. As for Ossetians, the Georgians regard them as strangers who have lived on Georgian land "only since the 17th century." There is also the North Ossetian autonomous republic in the Russian Federation. Tbilisi feared the prospect of unification of the two Ossetias. But lately the Georgian leaders have adopted a selective approach to autonomies. The Georgian parliament is also against the Adzhar autonomy. However, it is going to allow the population of that autonomous republic to decide their status by referen-

dum. It seems that the Abkhasian republic will remain.

The compilation of historical grievances, the painstaking study of the question of who came first to this land, has become an indispensable feature of all ethnic disputes. One can, of course, enrich his erudition in this way. However, in ethnic conflicts such disputes are senseless and have little effect. The point is not that a single historical version of events, a uniform interpretation of historical facts, does not exist. Each party emphasizes and singles out from history only what is advantageous to it. For instance, how far should one delve into the past in order to determine who is master and who is guest in a given territory?

In today's Georgia the Ossetians are regarded as "guests" — they live on the alien land, they are not driven out of this land and, therefore, should not lay claims. There is no South Ossetia, the present Georgian leaders contend. There is only Inner Georgia. Georgian historians admit that Ossetians appeared south of the Caucasian range in the 17th century. Ossetian historians assert that Ossetians have lived there since the 12th century. There is another theory. Since Ossetians are descended from Alans and the latter came from Scythes, one can talk about a 1,000-year presence of Ossetians in Georgia, because Scythian burials dating back to the ninth century have been found on its territory. "The Ossetians live on their primordial territory and reject pseudo-scientific concepts of their 'migration' and foreignness, that is, they have no reason to suffer from the guest syndrome," the news bulletin of the People's front of Ossetia notes.

Besides the ethnographic substantiation of the illegitimacy of Ossetian autonomy in

Georgia, there are arguments based on the recent past, namely, circumstances in which the South Ossetian autonomy was established by Bolsheviks and Stalin in 1922. If we regard the present structure of the Soviet Union from this point of view, we shall have to admit that it is illegitimate. None of the republics — whether Union or autonomous, or other national-state formations — was formed in a democratic way. No referendum was held to determine the wishes of the the peoples.

Tbilisi believes the conflict is being instigated by Moscow. It seems to dismiss the idea that Ossetians living on the territory of the Republic of Georgia might have their own interests.

The situation in Georgia becomes increasingly reminiscent of that in Lithuania a year ago. The leaders of the republic treat the "non-native" population in the same way as the central authorities treated the republic not so long ago. The laws on the official language, on citizenship, and on elections with residence qualification did not only hurt the reputation of the Lithuanian parliament in the Soviet Union and abroad, but also created political instability and, in the end, provided the ground for interference by the central government. Moreover, the situation in Lithuania cannot be compared to that in Tskhinvali, because people had not been killed in the Baltic republics before the army intervened.

It seems that the "republic-autonomy-centre" knot can be untied only within the framework of a broader political process, cooperation between democratic forces in all the republics which are trying to shake off the fetters of a unitary state. The events in Vilnius on the night of January 12 confirmed that republics need mutual assistance. I remember that, speaking at a plenum of the Democratic Russia on January 12, a representative of the Lithuanian republic admitted: one of the principal mistakes of the Lithuanian parliament was disregard of the need for ties with democratic forces in Russia.

Under a law now being drafted in Georgia citizenship will be granted only to the descendants of those who lived in the republic before 1922 (the year of entry into the Union) or even before 1801, when Georgia joined Russia.

Fourteen people have been killed in Lithuania. The number of those killed in Tskhinvali is already greater. What will be the reaction of those who can be declared "undesirable aliens" in Georgia? Ossetians, Abkhazians, Adzhars and persons "without citizenship" — Tbilisi seems to be creating a strong opposition to itself. Local conditions should be taken into account in Georgia. There are plenty of arms there, and they are used without hesitation. Does Gamsakhurdia predict a war of the Afghan type?...



Troops help maintain order in South Ossetia

The quiet republic

Our correspondents are just back from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Here is their first report — from Tallinn

Large concrete blocks are piled up in Toompea Square not far from the parliament of Estonia. They are all covered with satirical caricatures of the leaders of the Centre and with appeals to defend the republic's independence. This concrete jungle sprang up as a response to the events in Vilnius of January 13. From a military point of view, none of this made any sense but the wall was, no doubt, a symbol of disobedience to Moscow. Local "Swiss guards" — Kodukaitse and Kaitseliit riflemen — are on duty day and night near the only opening in the wall. But so far there have been no armed clashes. "Everything is quiet in Estonia," local people assure us unanimously. Therefore, the guards take pleasure in posing for local and foreign cameramen.

The 400,000-strong Popular Front (PF) of Estonia, which holds a majority in the republican parliament, faced serious problems after the Vilnius tragedy. What was to be done? Stand firm to the end paying no attention to the threats of the Centre or make a painful compromise? The all-Estonian plebiscite of March 3 regarding the population's attitude towards an independent republic is not likely to solve existing problems. Even the nationwide approval of independence, as exists in Lithuania, does not guarantee the recognition by the Centre of new realities in the Baltic republics. At the same time PF leaders realize that the population's backing will be ensured only as long as the Popular Front meets the people's expectations. That promises made since the day it was set up are kept.

Economic troubles aggravate political instability. The output of Estonia's enterprises is piled up at storehouses. There are still some goods in the shops, but their prices are so exorbitant that customers cannot afford them. The usual boiled sausage which, as the Tallinn residents maintain, "even a cat won't eat" costs 9 rubles a kilogram. Money is not put into circulation. There is no turnover tax or profit receipts in the republican budget which threatens to undermine the government's social programmes. Estonia's plants and factories are on the brink of bankruptcy. According to Meelis Virkebau, production manager of the Tarbeklaas factory, no one can guarantee wages for workers after March 1,

1991. And this will quite clearly cause social upheaval and will affect the representatives of all 109 nationalities residing in Estonia, which is usually considered to be 61% Estonian and 39% Russian-speaking.

Edgar Savisaar's government has to oppose not only the economic sabotage of

The Baltic republics after the events in Vilnius

What is in store for them?

Independence?

Compromise with Moscow?

Civil war?

the Centre, but also participate in those unpopular measures (raising of retail and purchasing prices, exchange of bank notes) which Moscow forces upon all the republics. Economic chaos began there somewhat earlier than, say, in Russia.

The first bloodshed in Vilnius on New Year's day (old style) confused PF leaders. The gap between the supporters of a tough policy regarding Moscow and those who favour a dialogue with the Centre has widened. This dissension is being whipped up by a constant struggle for power within the PF. Prestigious government structures have swelled still more. Thus, Estonia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had a staff of 7 people, now has 40; the number of diplomatic passports issued to "people's deputies" now exceeds 700.

Who are these "hawks" and "doves"? In a sense, Indrek Toome can be considered a "dove." He is one of the most popular politicians in Estonia, at one time helping actively the establishment of the PF. Today he heads the Vaba Eesti movement, which is in opposition to the Estonian government.

"Now we are going through a period of transition from being a part of the USSR to a sovereign Estonian republic," says Indrek Toome. "It is practically impossible to secede and sever all contacts with the Soviet Union at one fell stroke. It is not even necessary."

"I think that a true coalition government is now more essential for Estonia. Therefore, it is necessary to gain the trust of the Russian-speaking population. After all, on this depends the future of democracy in Estonia and Estonia's future in general."

"The USSR won't be preserved in the form we have grown accustomed to. The imperial approach is doomed. I believe that a new type of state will arise, something like the British Commonwealth. In fact, the Soviet Union includes quite a number of regions interested in this kind of community."

But Toomas Leito, Editor-in-Chief of the government paper *Rahva Hää*, thinks differently. At one time he worked for two years in Staraya Ploshchad (CPSU Central Committee headquarters) in Moscow. Now he supports a tough approach to his former associates.

"Estonia doesn't have to secede from the USSR since our republic has never joined it on its own. It was unscrupulously occupied in 1940."

"The USSR today is an empire in the classical sense. The Centre is trying to do the impossible — to keep the Union intact at all costs."

"Our positions in the economic sphere are also irreconcilable. The Centre is coming out for a mythical 'renovated socialism,' whereas we stand for a market economy. It is our firm belief that socialism is not viable and in this we differ in principle from the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE) and the Intermovement."

"We assess the events in Vilnius of January 13 as an attempt by the Centre to do away with independence in the Baltic republics. After that political forces became sharply polarized in Estonia. Many Russians came to understand our position. The latest plebiscite shows that approximately 40% of them already support Estonian independence."

"Sometimes we are accused of supporting physical elimination of Communists. That is not true. Of course, there are right-wing nationalistic forces demanding that something like a Nuremberg Trial be held for CPE members."



The road to Toompea is blocked for tanks?

significant part of political spectrum. You must agree that groups of fools may be found in any country...

"Our relations with the Soviet Army are better than in the other Baltic republics. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that the commander of the local garrison, Vice-Admiral Belov, is a very sensible and intelligent person. But in principle I think that relationships with the army must be regulated by agreements between states.

"The Popular Front maintains that a plebiscite in Estonia must be held earlier, on March 3, 1991, in order to answer the main question: 'Do you want the restoration of state sovereignty and independence of the Estonian republic?' In short, we should not give in to the Kremlin's wishes. Our participation in the March 17 referendum *de jure* makes us members of the Union treaty and we must avoid this."

The bloody events in Vilnius stimulated the grassroots in the Intermovement to act. Certain people, considering that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation "had abandoned the Russians to be torn to pieces by national-fascists," took a radical stance and, in their political views, teamed up with the Communist Party of Russia. Others (so far they form the minority) began to seek points of contact with PF members.

...We are in the parliament building of Estonia. Russian-speaking and Estonian deputies occupy different rooms. We talk to deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia, Vladimir Lebedev and Sergei Petinov who have just finished a hunger-strike of protest against "ignoring the elementary legal and humanitarian norms of Estonia's supreme bodies of power."

Vladimir Lebedev:

The virus of nationalism germinated here, in Estonia. And we started fighting it earlier

than others. Estonian revenge-seekers dream of restoring bourgeois society. If they come to power, they won't hesitate to destroy all the achievements of socialism.

Sergei Petinov:

The Estonian bodies of power orientate themselves towards disintegration of the USSR and civil war. Ten percent of Estonia's population are deprived of the right to vote. That includes the military and members of their families as well as those working for the defence industry and Union ministries. Nationalists form militarized detachments...

The young and very handsome deputies scared us with horrible scenes of life in Estonia under the rule of "national-separatists" which we, honestly speaking, did not see there... Accusations of the PF were all heaped up: there was a mention of the Nazis coming to power in Germany, of the Russians becoming second-grade people, of Estonian "democrats" being bought out by the CIA, and so on.

Comparing the statements of PF members with ardent speeches by the spokesmen for the Intermovement, the only conclusion we came to is this: the radicalism of some gives rise to extremism among others. The conversation with the deputies developed into a real meeting.

The deputies from Intermovement strongly disliked the stand taken by Russia's Parliament and particularly its chairman. "We mustn't allow our country to be divided up among different nationalities," Vladimir Lebedev tried to persuade us. "And this is exactly what Russia's parliament, headed by Yeltsin, is doing..."

The deputies we talked to referred to their opponents from the PF as "separatists." On the other hand, they themselves threatened Edgar Savisaar and his cabinet with a repetition of the "Moldavian lesson." What they meant by

this was a possibility, under unfavourable circumstances for them, to cut off the Russian-speaking north-east from the rest of the Estonian republic.

Confrontation in Estonia has no vividly expressed ethnic character. There are small Russian sections in the Popular Front and small Estonian groups in Intermovement. One of their spokesmen, Arnold Sai, a member of the Coordinating Council of the Intermovement, fully backs his associates: "All that is happening in our republic is its fascistization. Pro-fascist parties are being legalized, monuments to Lenin pulled down and instead of

them monuments to all sorts of scum-bags are being erected. I am an Estonian but I detest the whipping up of nationalistic psychosis. Far from all Estonians, although they are now frightened, back separatists from Toompea. I travel extensively around the republic and hear quite often from ordinary rural workers: "Fight for Soviet power."

The workers' detachments of Intermovement had training sessions in marksmanship at the Männiku shooting range, not far from Tallinn. Similar exercises were held near Rapla where Soviet military units are quartered. The exercises of the Baltic military district commanders and staff personnel, held in some regions of Estonia from February 10 to 20 added fuel to the fire. Their "planned" character was hardly opportune.

The situation in Estonia is viewed quite differently from Moscow. Being there and observing events personally we must admit that quite often we had to give up former views and assessments we had in Moscow of what happened in the republic. It is quite likely that the Centre, too, continues to look at the events in the Baltics in the old way, believing, for example, that the 60 to 40 ratio of Estonians to non-Estonians will play into its hands, considerably influencing the distribution of forces and the results of the March 3 plebiscite. But it may so happen that the scenario of events, as presumed by Moscow, will take a different turn, disadvantageous for the Centre, just as it happened after the plebiscite in Lithuania. Therefore, wouldn't it be better to give up straight away former methods of confrontation, of whipping up tension in the Baltic republics, and pass over to a reasonable and equal political dialogue with them?

We have learned one lesson in Estonia - "no one must be cornered"...

*Yakov Borovoi,
Alexander Chudodeyev*

Revolution from below?

The threat of a military coup which at first disconcerted only a few publicists and parliamentarians has come more and more to worry ordinary citizens. People fear that some military commander will up and want to deal personally and with an iron fist with what he sees as careerist-perestroika fanatics, questionable democrats, slack intellectuals and, as a famous Russian satirist, Shchedrin, wrote, "ride into the city on a white horse, burn down the schools and abolish all the sciences," at the same time answering the needs of the labourers and establishing a genuine socialist order.

Judging from some statements, the search for "enemies of the state" with the goal of eliminating them in order to set up such a social order has already begun. It is difficult however to imagine one of the military high-command assuming the role of a Soviet Pinochet. Even generals learn from past historical experience. They realize that history doesn't forgive those who, start coups. It is another thing altogether if the coup initiative were to start from below, from anonymous "national salvation committees" backed by officers who are unsatisfied with their social status. In that case all the higher-ups would have to do is give in to the demands of their underlings which would serve as a brilliant political alibi for their actions.

That such an initiative from below could come is a real possibility. If one believes Lithuanian radio, the commander of the Vilnius garrison wrote a letter to Landsbergis at the end of January in which he warned that units of his garrison were beginning to lose their patience and that their actions could become uncontrollable.

I was in Vilnius not long ago and I know how the military feel there. They are considered foreign occupiers, are not given flats, the children of officers have a hard time finding places in schools, nurseries and kindergartens. Worse than that, the Party politicians use them for their own ends without reservation and refuse to take responsibility for their actions or consequences.

However, if one leaves aside the mistreatment at the hands of politicians and the abusive term "foreign occupiers", the remaining points of discontent - poor living conditions, lack of adequate schools etc. - are no different than the realities of life in the near-by city of Pskov or far-off Irkutsk, any other small city or a village in the taiga: "Soldiers, our sons, freeze in 20-degree-below-zero weather living in tents while officers and their families live in barracks," a Regional Party Committee secretary not long ago complained the Central Committee of the CPSU. And the longer such a situation continues to exist, the more heated the soldiers' gripes with the local authorities will become.

It would seem fitting here to digress a little. In the majority of countries the local authorities dream up ways of acquiring a military base in their own


district as bases near cities help the municipal budgets by paying for land and buildings occupied as well as community services they receive. The military are people who receive money from the state treasury and spend it in the local shops. This spurs an improvement in trade, social services and cultural life of their community. It means new jobs and, what is also important, prospective husbands for local women. In other words, a military base for the municipal authorities is a real boon. But in our country everything is completely the opposite. A military garrison means even more shortages, and added strain on an already over-stretched budget and an even more severe housing problems. And although this absurdity has been around for some time, the following is without question: the more successful is a city's or region's switch to an independent form of economic management the more visceral the servicemen's complaints directed at the local authorities.

What now is to be done? Should one come out against independent economic management, a market economy and democracy in the municipalities. How long will we continue to attack the wrong targets? It is time we came to a realisation of how things really stand. For many decades now we have spent roughly a fifth of our national income on the needs of our nearly four million servicemen. The remaining four-fifths have gone to the almost 300 million of our inhabitants. If one compares these figures, it becomes clear that blaming local authorities, democrats and other "enemies of the state" for the ills of officers' families is at the very least unethical. Hadn't our military and industrial complex produced at least a half of the tanks now being scrapped and at least a half of the Euromissiles scrapped already, the officers' families would not have been huddled together in barracks and shanties today. An every retired veteran who served faithfully in far-away garrisons, every veteran whose health had been ruined, every one of them could receive, along with his military discharge papers, the key to a flat or cottage in one of the prosperous regions of the country.

But all this is, alas, only a dream. For now we assemble more tanks than any other country in the world and produce more aircraft carrying cruisers, all in an attempt to maintain our status as a world power. By force of intellectual inertia, we refuse to accept the fact that nowadays a country does not win respect and great power status by virtue of its military arsenal. It does so by virtue of its economic might, science, culture, and how well it provides for its citizens, including those who serve in its armed forces.

And what of the search for enemies? That is something we have already gone through. And the more enemies we found and eliminated the further away we came from the ideals we proclaimed and from normal living conditions, conditions free of communal flats, barracks, lines and shortages.

The more we searched for and eliminated "enemies of the state" the further away we moved from normal living conditions



Alexander
Didusenko

How to overcome the 1941 syndrome

Gely Batenin, Major General

Five arguments in favour of a professional army. Will they outweigh traditional approaches?

The debate about what kind of an army this country needs reflects society's concern over the future of its Armed Forces. However, polemic fervour often prevents us from noticing how we mechanically associate our own vision of the crisis of "developed

socialism" with the army as a whole.

Naturally the crisis of a system means the crisis of all elements and institutions of that system. On the other hand, the scale and quality of crisis phenomena differ in each concrete case. If this fact is ignored or misunderstood, then the assessment of the crisis becomes distorted, as was the case with the article by Simon Kordonsky (*NT*, No. 2, 1991). Uncompromising, exaggerated assessments of the negative features of what the author called "our antiquated state" are spearheaded against the army. What for, may I ask? To shock the military and civilian reformers of the Soviet Armed Forces? Or to insult military professionals by mentioning defence research centres' "using stolen technological and scientific achievements," or by saying that this country has no qualified experts who could cope with the task of "the optimization of the army and conversion of the defence potential"?

At the same time, Kordonsky's article contains something that is too often missing from many other articles on the army's problems. First of all, one cannot fail to observe the author's brilliant logic when he speaks on the paths to military reform which lead nowhere. In other words, Kordonsky presents a political scientist's view on what kind of an army we do not need. Few military experts would disagree with the author's unfortunately cursory ideas about the new military-political and geopolitical priorities in the military development of the USSR. Meanwhile, some considerations may be relevant in this connection.

New thinking and the army

The Soviet Armed Forces are living through a deep socio-psychological and moral and political crisis. The inside aspect of this crisis may be described as low discipline, a lack of professionalism, low morale and poor combat efficiency of the Army and the Navy as a whole. From the outside, this crisis manifests itself in young people's unwillingness to serve in the army and the decline of the Armed Forces' authority as the guarantor of national security. The deep-seated reason behind the crisis is the contradiction between the

extremely conservative forms of the existence of the army, inherited from the centralized bureaucratic system in its very worst, the Prussian variant, and the policy of perestroika and new political thinking. Two factors have aggravated this crisis: the war in Afghanistan and the restoration of the army's function as an instrument of coercion at home.

Let us not forget that the Americans had their own Vietnam syndrome which generated dangerous tensions in society, massive anti-war pressure on the administration and a dramatic drop in the prestige of military service. The crisis was overcome in 1975 thanks to a prompt transition to an all-volunteer army and the creation of professional armed forces. Political and social fears (concerning a mercenary spirit, racism and the emergence of castes in the army) and the negative economic forecasts, which predicted growing military spendings, proved groundless. The transition to a professional army was predated by an unprecedented propaganda and promotion campaign and a federal programme for school and college students and reservists which had been designed to boost the prestige of military service. The main factor, however, was that the military-political leadership of the United States realized that it was necessary to radically reorganize the old system of manning the armed forces. This allowed the United States to create an effective professional army with high morale and excellent combat and technical training. The US army today is prestigious, well-disciplined and, in a sense, democratic.

The task facing us today is twofold: we must radically reshape both the system of recruiting and the organizational pattern of the Armed Forces. This reshaping must be in line with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency – the main element of Soviet military doctrine which expresses qualitative rather than quantitative parameters of the army's organizational structure.

The opponents of any changes in the existing recruiting principle often quote Frederick Engels' words about "the quality of the human material" in the context of the dependence of the military sphere on the degree of development of society's socio-economic infrastructure. Thus they try to prove that, first, this country has no conditions for adopting the voluntary recruiting principle (the word "mercenary" is used by them in its purely derogatory meaning). Second, the opponents of the army reform want to shield the military leadership from not always groundless criticisms concerning the poor training of the army cadres and the decline of discipline and prestige of the military service. These attempts to protect the inviolability of universal military duty can be understood, nonetheless there are a number of arguments in favour of a democratic alternative to the existing system of conscription.

Forces to follow the "fundamentals" of strategic, tactical and battlefield offensive operations.

The configuration and deep-echeloned pattern of the Army (meaning in this case the ground-gaining troops) and the assisting Air Force and Air Defence units corresponded (or at least everything possible was done to make them correspond) to the above-mentioned doctrine from the forward edge of the Warsaw Pact across to the Urals and even farther.

Hence the unprecedented Soviet tank buildup (over 40,000 in the European theatre alone), the galloping deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles and the costly attempts to upset the Eurostrategic balance of forces by massive deployment of SS-20s.

Oriented at large-scale offensive operations, this strategy exhausted our economy, ailing as it was, and required a four-million-strong army with too many heavy armaments and a surprisingly weak computer and electronic backing. Today the USSR boasts one of the world's highest militarization ratios: 138 men out of every 10,000 are soldiers (not counting such branches and services as the border guards, interior troops, railway engineers and military construction teams). It must be mentioned for the sake of comparison that the corresponding ratio is 83/10,000 in the United States and 63/10,000 in Germany.

Today the characteristic features of this country's Armed Forces are an excessive numerical and quantitative strength which may be needed only in the event of the immediate threat of war, little mobility and obsolete organizational patterns. Modern Soviet military doctrine will start to work only when this country develops flexible, highly mobile defensive structures able to react quickly to changes in the international military-political situation and to rebuff adequately any challenge. **This is the nucleus of the "containment-deterrence" strategy.**

The three echelons of the "peace front"

The ideology of the new Armed Forces' development must be dominated by one principle: peacetime is the principal and maybe the only period for the Armed Forces

and their most important mission is to prevent wars. To realize the military containment factor, a corresponding reorganization of the Armed Forces is necessary.

The first and principal structural element of the army must be rapid deployment forces. Strategically, these forces consist of what may be described as three echelons.

First, the strategic echelon: the existing strategic nuclear triad - Air Defence, Anti-Missile Defence and Space Defence. **Second**, the tactical echelon: ground-gaining forces, Air Force and Air Defence, represented by air-mobile and air-assault divisions, which will act as a sword at major theatres of operations. **Third**, the battlefield echelon: ground-gaining troops, Air Force and Air Defence consisting of battle-ready combat and auxiliary units, something like what was known in the USSR as "fortified defence areas" acting as a shield in major theatres.

The three-echelon pattern of the main element of the reformed Armed Forces capable of reacting to any threat quickly and effectively, will, of course, require a revision of our views on the role and place of military regions in the national defence system. In the new hierarchy, the military regions will lose their traditional strategic and tactical importance, because their basic functions will be transferred to the "sword" and "shield" commands.

The military regions (one in each republic and up to three in Russia) will supervise administrative matters in their territories. On the whole, they will make up the **second element** of the Armed Forces, incorporating military commissariats, training centres, training divisions and flexible composition regiments.

Thus the military regions will be responsible for mobilization plans in their territories in the event of war or emergency, training of reservists, controlling national and territorial reserve formations, and patriotic education of draft-age people in order to ensure sufficient voluntary manning of the army.

The status of a superpower has to be confirmed economically, socially and politically. The Gulf war demonstrates that it must also be confirmed militarily.

P rime Minister Pavlov's announcement that banks in Europe and America are trying to overthrow President Gorbachev by flooding the Soviet Union with 50-ruble and 100-ruble notes has caused great alarm throughout the western world.

If it were true, it would indeed be terrifying. The West has problems of its own. It does not need to add to them by an attempt to bring down the Soviet government. We are at war in the Persian Gulf. In Europe we need stability, not clumsy adventures.

I suppose, though, that this is not what alarms us. No westerner in his right mind believes that there are "dark western forces" trying to create chaos in superpower politics. We do not believe Mr Pavlov's story of western sabotage and it does not occur to us that any great number of Soviet people believe it either.

We are alarmed because it is a very serious matter when one of the leaders of a powerful neighbouring government plunges into the depths of fantasy, for reasons unknown to us, but presumably of internal politics. It alarms us because it seems to mean that perestroika, on which we all rely for a peaceful and prosperous future, is at risk.

It shows, as far as we can understand the signals, that some of the Soviet leaders do not want East-West cooperation. And it makes us very confused, because other Soviet leaders are asking for East-West cooperation, in particular East-West trade, to be increased.

As a member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, I was one of those who recently helped to negotiate a transfer of food worth \$300 million to Soviet organizations - and a loan of \$600 million for emergency food purchases. We have also agreed to give \$500 million in technical assistance.

Five of the best-known British firms are working with the government of the Ukrainian SSR to help improve the system of food distribution. The Ukrainians asked for this help and the British taxpayer is paying \$500,000 for it. "There is food in the warehouses, but not enough food in the shops," they told us. "We need a better system." There is another British scheme to modernize Estonia's docks. There are many French schemes in Armenia.

Fantasy on a western theme

Member of the European Parliament, **Lord Nicholas Bethell** answers Soviet Premier Valentin Pavlov

"Other western firms have been invited to invest in the Soviet economy, to set up joint enterprises. We understood that this was the policy of the Soviet government. Now, though, Valentin Pavlov tells us that this is not so, that our help is not welcome, since western firms are planning a "silent and bloodless annexation" of the Soviet economy.

At the end of last year Soviet leaders asked the West to help relieve the lack of food in Soviet cities. Then we saw on television parcels of western food being distributed in Moscow and Leningrad. And then, suddenly, we were told by the head of the KGB that this food was poisoned, that it had been sent as part of a plot to destabilize the Soviet government.

This return to the language of the Stalin era causes us great distress. What does the Soviet government want from us? Do they want us to help? Or do they want us to leave them to sort out the Soviet economy on their own? I wish that they would make up their minds. If all foreign-financed projects in the Soviet Union are bad, as Valentin Pavlov said a few days ago, I will no longer advise my British voters to spend their money on them.

In Lenin's and Stalin's day such flights of fantasy were understandable. Britain and the United States were against the Revolution. Winston Churchill said that he would strangle the Bolshevik infant in its cradle. He sent troops to help the White side. Many people regret that he did it. Others regret merely that he failed in his task. In either case, his actions were logical. He did not like something and so he tried to destroy it.

During the Cold War it was the same. The Soviet Union seemed to us an aggressive power. It set up pro-Soviet governments in central Europe, deployed many thousands of tanks along the "Iron curtain," recruited spies to discover western technology and helped western communist movements. Nikita Khrushchev told us, "We shall bury you."

The West reacted as one might ex-



Lord Bethell in Leningrad

Photo by Keith Waldegrave

pect, by sending agents and propaganda into the Soviet Union, by doing everything possible to cause dismay in the adversary's camp. It is, for the moment, not important to work out who was right and who was wrong. Quite simply, there was an acute East-West conflict. And both sides were doing their best, or their worst, to hurt the others.

However regrettable these events of decades ago may have been, they had their own logic in terms of the politics of those days. But what Mr Pavlov says has no logic. In his *Trud* interview he says that President Gorbachev "has been getting in people's way," that he has become "an inconvenient politician" and that this is why the West is trying to get rid of him.

This is absolutely the opposite of the truth. Western governments need President Gorbachev. They love President Gorbachev. I do not know to whom President Gorbachev is **inconvenient**. Maybe to certain groups inside the Soviet Union. But he is certainly not inconvenient to western governments. Indeed they adore him, in

some people's view, a little too much.

Recently they have criticized him over what has been happening in the Baltic states - but very mildly. They are still overflowing with gratitude to him for permitting the emergence of democratic governments in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and for taking part in the unification of Germany. Above all, they are grateful to him for his support in the Gulf war.

Westerners do not suffer the problems of the Soviet Union's ethnic strife, the increase in crime or the food shortages. They therefore do not share the Soviet people's disillusionment with perestroika and they think of President Gorbachev only in positive terms.

Western leaders like Bush, Thatcher, Mitterrand and Kohl have gained benefit at home through their good relations with the Russian leader who has changed the map of international politics, by reducing East-West tension and so providing for a future without nuclear war.

Reforming Soviet leaders admired in the West - Shevardnadze, Bakatin, Fyodorov, Shatalin, Filshin and others - have now left the government. The love affair with the Soviet President, the so-called "gorbymania," is therefore not as pure as it was. The West would like to see quicker movement towards a market economy and independence for some of the Republics. But we are not going to try to destabilize the Soviet Union in order to achieve this, not after all Mr Gorbachev did last year and certainly not while there is a war on.

The recent political shift to the "conservative" side merely increases the West's admiration for President Gorbachev. He is the only reformer left, it seems. He is the last straw for those who still believe in perestroika to clutch. What will happen if he is forced out? It would be a great leap into the political unknown, something that our leaders would be most unwilling to contemplate.

I can think of no one in the West who would pay 20 billion rubles for President Gorbachev's removal. I can think of many, in the highest reaches of our governments, who would be ready to pay 20 billion dollars to keep him in power.

One last chance

Like Iraqis, Palestinians are also paying heavily for Saddam's aggression

This issue will have been printed already when we learn how Saddam Hussein responded to Gorbachev's peace initiatives. It is important that so far Gorbachev has not dropped the demand that the Iraqis pull out of Kuwait, although some Soviet MPs are energetically calling for a halt to the combat, which means, in actuality, abandoning Kuwait to Saddam's mercy.

I will not venture into guessing which course the Gulf crisis will take: many scenarios have already been suggested. Baghdad may put off its pullout so as to make sure the allied ground offensive is delayed until the beginning of sand storms in the desert. Or it may withdraw the troops in order to save them from the otherwise inevitable defeat and for other wars in the future.

Iraq and Kuwait are not the only characters involved in the Gulf drama: other sides have become involved as well, particularly, the Palestinians. Saddam Hussein pledged he would restore justice and return Palestinians their native lands. In reality, though, the situation is absolutely different: the Iraqi aggression has only exacerbated the plight of the Palestinian people. The central problem of the Middle East has not moved an inch closer to settlement. On the contrary, today the Palestinian problem seems even more difficult to solve than ever before.

The PLO's big mistake

Chairman Yasser Arafat of the PLO and President Hussein of Iraq are reported not to see entirely eye to eye. I asked some Palestinians I knew how true this information might be and they told me it was a bluff.

At the same time TASS reported virtually the same thing when referring to a different source of information. It said that Saddam Hussein had accused Yasser Arafat of the PLO's having failed to open a second front against Israel and being too passive. The Palestinian leader lashed back and reminded the Iraqi president that the PLO was actually out of money: Saddam had seized and shows no inclination of returning some \$10 billion belonging to the State of Palestine. In addition, Baghdad provided shelter to the terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal which had killed Arafat's lieutenants in Tunisia.

Could these developments have been pre-

dicted? Most likely, yes. In retrospect the current strife seems to have been more than predictable. Once again one has to return to the well-known examples. Contempt for international norms and law (gassing of Kurdish rebels and their families), treachery (aggression against Iran), betrayal (annexation of Kuwait which had financially supported Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war) — these are some of Saddam's characteristic features which should have put the Palestinians on their guard. Unfortunately, this never happened. The Palestinians were mesmerized by the Iraqi army, the strongest army in the Arab world, which they believed could solve their problem once and for all. The feeling of despair and anguish of the Palestinians with whom Israel stubbornly refused to negotiate is understandable. In other words, the PLO hoped that Saddam Hussein, who is notorious for his unprecedented cruelty, would wipe Israel off the map and present the whole of Palestine to the PLO. These expectations never came true, however.

If the reports of frictions between Iraq and the PLO are true, one can easily imagine the difficult situation the PLO leadership must now be in. They cannot openly criticize the Iraqi leader without losing the last hope of getting back the budget of the State of Palestine. There is no doubt that Saddam will keep the \$10 billion once the PLO crosses him.

At the same time, common Palestinians living in the occupied lands continue to support Saddam and to display his portraits at demonstrations. Are the Palestinians the only ones?

The world has duly appreciated the civilized approach to the Gulf crisis demonstrated by King Hassan II of Morocco, President Mubarak of Egypt and President Assad of Syria. However, one has to admit that common people in Morocco, Syria and Egypt support Saddam. It turns out that the Arab masses believe the United States, not Iraq, is the aggressor. Everybody is speaking with indignation about the atrocities committed by the Americans, choosing to forget that the anti-Iraq coalition is made up of 29 countries. At the same time, few people took note of the Iraqi aggressor's atrocities committed in occupied Kuwait, of which the United Nations informed the whole world. The fanatics who believe Kuwait is nothing but Iraq's 19th province never bother to think why the people living in that province should be robbed and killed on Saddam orders?



Baghdad under fire

It even seems that Baghdad cannot wait for the allies to start hitting civilian targets, not only military and suspect installations, so as to raise a hue and cry all over the world. It was the Iraqi leader who stationed many military installations in urban areas. Doesn't Saddam feel any pity for his own compatriots whom he is ready to sacrifice for propaganda sake? If Iraqi civilians get hurt, the blame will be on Saddam completely. At the same time, no one seems to pay attention to Iraq's continuing missile attacks against civilian targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. The only response to these attacks has been threatening grumbling: just let Israel try and retaliate. Muslims are enraged when they see GIs treading on the sacred soil of Arabia, but display no reaction to Saddam's missile attacks against civilian targets in the Muslim Holy Land. Besides shelling civilian targets, Saddam also aims at oil fields which, if hit, may turn Islam's holiest shrines in Mecca into a blazing inferno.

Many are accusing the United States of having engineered an ecological catastrophe, although it was Saddam who ordered the ignition of the oil fields in Kuwait and the pumping of oil into the Gulf. The Arabs did not display any special concern either when Saddam gassed the families of Kurdish rebels, although the chemical weapons attack against the Kurdish villages left at least 2,000 children and even more adults dead. Saddam's return to Iran of the border area which hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers had died to capture was completely ignored.

I may be criticized for calling millions of people fanatics for their sympathies with Saddam, but is there any other word strong enough to describe them? Let them count how many Arabs and Muslims in general have been killed by world Zionism headed by Israel and the world imperialism headed by the US over the past four decades. I am sure

the number will be a great deal less than the number of Saddam's victims. The Iraqi aggression against Iran alone cost some one million Muslim lives. Besides this, there were summary executions of Iraqi Communists and the genocide of the Kurds living in Iraq. Saddam is also responsible for the death of many Kuwaitis and Iraqis killed as a result of his annexation of Kuwait.

Some revelations about Israel

Unfortunately, a fanatic's mind stops grasping the most obvious things if they contradict his or her beliefs. The fact that the Arabs were the first to unleash the 1948 war with Israel and not vice versa is completely erased from Arab memory. President Gamal Nasser's conviction that Israel must be wiped out is widely shared today. This is why the harsh condemnations of the "Zionist Entity" for its unwillingness to negotiate with the Arabs are nothing but the result of the Arabs' feeble historical memory.

Israel made peace with Egypt and has observed its commitments ever since, despite occasional terrorist attacks launched from Egyptian soil. I am sure that Israel will return the now occupied southern territories to Lebanon once it makes sure that no bombing raids will ever hit Israel from there. If Syria behaves as Egypt did, it will most probably get the Golan Heights back too.

Surely, the now forgotten peace initiatives of Yasser Arafat, were a serious positive shift in the Arab position. He could not regard the PLO initiatives as a mere tactical move, accompanied by terrorist attacks against Israel committed by a PLO faction which disagreed with Arafat. This

leadership to decline the invitation to hold peace talks with the Palestinians.


Some Israelis told me that if Israel returned the occupied territories to the Arabs, these territories would immediately be turned into a terrorist stronghold from which Islamic fanatics and numerous Arab terrorist groups would launch a jihad to destroy Israel. Will the PLO be able to control the terrorists and make them live in peace with Israel? Hardly, since inside the PLO many factions have no reservations about genocide against the Jews. Hence the confrontation, the "war of stones" and the Israeli troops' shooting back.

Afer I visited the Calvary in Jerusalem, I went out through the gates of the Ancient City and headed for a taxi stop nearby. A small group of Arab taxi drivers stood by, joking and laughing. Another group consisted of Jewish taxi drivers who talked about something vividly. I beckoned to one Arab driver who looked displeased with my taking him away from the jolly company and addressed him in Arabic, saying I was a Soviet journalist, supported the just cause of the Palestinians and their legitimate leader, the PLO. As I spoke the expression on the driver's face soured. When I stopped talking, he said angrily:

"A just cause, you say? That's what you think. You are setting all kinds of bandits on us. We live well, we have good jobs and make good money here. What do you want from us? We live in peace and no one's doing us any harm. And then your patriotic friends come and persuade our boys to revolt and cause bloodshed..."

I understand that my mentioning the taxi driver is an unfair example, but it is a fact. When in Israel I only used taxi three times: one was driven by an Arab driver, another by a Jewish one and a third by an Afghan driver. Any colleague may as well try and do the same if he or she happens to be in Israel.

When in Israel I saw pictures and documents connected with the killings of the so-called collaborationists - residents of the occupied lands, who worked in Israel. One of the victims was an old Palestinian chairwoman who had died of numerous knife wounds. In the morning lots of Arabs head for Israel to work, but for some of them this means a death sentence. According to the statistics supplied by the Israeli authorities, the number of Palestinian zealots during the intifada has amounted to 342 by February 18 of this year.



A pro-Saddam demonstration in Amman: are the Arabs blind?

On a deserted highway in the West Bank, I found a small café and fancied a snack. The café-keepers were quite hospitable, but the younger of them went out and watched the highway attentively. The owner of the café later told me that a strike had been declared and he was not to service anyone. On the other hand, he had to earn at least some money and worked secretly, posting his son outside to watch: God forbid the PLO fighters find him out.

The situation in Israel is not as simple as it may seem. When I returned from Israel I had already been convinced that Arabs and Jews could live in peace with one another. I fully agree with the prominent Palestinian figure, Feisal al-Husseiny, who is settled in Jerusalem. He told me that Jerusalem could only exist as a common capital of the Jews and the Arabs and in his opinion, there was no way to run the city except that by a mixed Arab-Jewish city council. Jews and Arabs must cooperate to live in peace.

However, a peaceful solution to the problem does not suit fanatics: they thirst for blood.

Conclusions and fears

In the current war, Israel dropped the preventive strike doctrine it has advocated since 1967. In this unprecedented situation, Israel exercises restraint and gains much politically. Some Arab leaders have already declared they would not retaliate if Israel chooses to strike back at Iraq. In any case, the self-proclaimed Zionism-buster Saddam has done a great service to his arch-enemy.

At the same time Saddam did a disservice to his Palestinian brothers. Money is not the only thing that mat-

ters. Saddam is trying hard to push the PLO in open terrorism, being fully aware of the consequences this may entail. By turning the PLO into a terrorist organization, Saddam will rob it of its status as the legitimate representatives of the Arab people of Palestine and make it the target of an Interpol hunt.

Now it is time to think about the future which will have to be shaped on the ruins of the Gulf war. There are no doubts that the efforts of the international community will be focused on the Palestinian problem.

It is difficult to make any political forecasts for the future now. Saddam had forced the world community into a

difficult and ambiguous situation, where even the most humane and good intentions are fraught with more violence and aggression.

Much is said about the necessity to make the Middle East a zone of peace at last. The Soviet leadership shares this view as well. However, the Soviet top brass seem to be of a different opinion. The recent visit of the Syrian Minister of Defence, Mustafa Tlas to Moscow has produced unexpected and vexing results: massive deliveries of Soviet-made state-of-the-art weaponry to the Middle East are resumed. Can one really be sure that in the long run Syria's Assad will not be replaced by yet another fanatical general?

Saddam has been given the last chance. Will he use it for new manoeuvring and butchering of his own people, or will he opt to honour the shared human laws?

Obviously, for the PLO too it is time to think about the ways to restore unity in its ranks: the choice is between the irreconcilables and the more moderate factions. The Organization faces a difficult task of rebuilding its international authority, seriously damaged by the PLO's support of the aggressive policies of Baghdad.

The world community will have to reflect on how to prevent the possible advent of other Saddam-type dictators. The first step towards lasting security in the Middle East must be a comprehensive and universal moratorium on arms supplies to the region. And the top-priority objective is to bring all the sides involved to the bargaining table.

Dmitry Zgersky

Photos from the magazines Times and Paris-Match



A soldier's farewell

The Indian echo

Will the Indian government survive the Gulf crisis?

No one in India thinks Saddam is an angel or supports the Iraqi aggression. At the same time, many Indian politicians frowned when they heard Premier Chandra Shekhar publicly declare shortly after the war had begun that the Iraqi leadership bore all the responsibility for the crisis.

Accusations of pro-Americanism in his foreign policy were showered on the prime minister. President of the Indian National Congress (I) Rajiv Gandhi sent a message to the premier accusing the latter of having forgot India's interests in the Gulf and reduced the country's role to that of a passive onlooker. Gandhi suggested another settlement formula which stipulates an immediate halt to all combat operations in the region, replacement of the coalition forces with UN peace-keepers, an Iraqi pull-out from Kuwait and settlement of other Middle Eastern problems, particularly the problem of Palestine.

More fuel was added to the flames when the Indian press found out at the end of January that the Shekhar government intended to allow US Air Force transport planes to refuel at the Indian airports of Madras and Bombay. The US Administration was the only one who lauded this decision. The joint declaration of four Indian left-wing parties condemned the decision as a disgraceful act betraying the principles of the non-allied movement and anti-imperialist solidarity. Romesh Bhandari, head of the international department of the INC (I) was even more outspoken when he said: "The essence of the matter is that we have become part of another power's military plans and indirectly a US ally."

At the beginning of February the INC Leadership decided to send a consignment of medicines and plasma to the people of Iraq. Effigies of George Bush and Chandra Shekhar were burnt in front of the US Embassy during the anti-war demonstrations organized by the communists. Both Communist Parties of India demanded that an extraor-

inary session of parliament be convened to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf and its possible consequences for India.

As more and more civilians get killed during the allies' continuing air raids against Iraq, the war in the Gulf is increasingly viewed in India as a battle between Goliath armed with the most advanced weapons ever built and David who's got nothing but a sling.

In his emotional statement of February 7, leader of the INC (I) Rajiv Gandhi stressed that the war in the Gulf was getting out of control. No objective in the name of which the war began had been achieved, Gandhi said, and Iraq had turned to a testing range for advanced weapons. The UN Security Council did not sanction the liberation of Kuwait through the elimination of Iraq. By making this declaration Gandhi openly questioned the sincerity of the United States in the Gulf. Return to the spirit and the letter of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and give peace one more chance, Gandhi urged. Rajiv's current intolerance vis-à-vis the Shekhar government's policies in the Gulf conflict is rooted in the former premier's purely humane qualities, many Indian observers agree. "Rajiv is used to always being the first," wrote the Bombay-based newspaper *The Daily*. He would love to act as a mediator between Saddam and Bush, no matter what it might cost him."

However, personal motives are not the only factor that pushes Indian politicians to reconsider their views on the war.

Statements of high-ranking US representatives who said that nuclear weapons might be used caused a great

amount of concern in the Indian political quarters. Addressing Chandra Shekhar, Rajiv Gandhi noted that the Indian nation had to warn the world community against such approaches to the use of nuclear arms. The hysteric anti-Saddam campaign under way in the West created an atmosphere in which the public opinion did not care any longer about the horrors of nuclear war in Iraq. Rajiv Gandhi demanded that India's permanent representative at the United Nations be instructed to insist that Security Council Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of all necessary means be never interpreted as allowing the coalition's resorting to nuclear weapons.

The INC (I) spokesman, J. Akbar who made public the Gandhi statement went even farther when he said: "If the United States use nuclear arms in the personalized war against Saddam Hussein, India will have to reconsider its peaceful nuclear policies in order to protect the nation from the nuclear threat proceeding from the national interests."

So far the Shekhar government has not entered the debate with the INC (I) on these issues widely discussed in India's political quarters and the public. Since the INC (I) refused to form a coalition government thus allowing Shekhar and his cabinet to come to power last November, Chandra Shekhar and Rajiv Gandhi have developed serious differences and not on the Gulf problem alone. In this context the political prospects of the Shekhar government look rather clouded. To describe the current state of affairs between India's two most influential politicians *The Daily* resorted to the following comparison: Rajiv Gandhi controls the speed and the brakes. Chandra Shekhar is a puppet driver in a rented car and has to watch Rajiv's every movement. This situation allows local observers to suggest the following scenario: The INC (I) will soon refuse to support the current government and may try to form a new government headed by Rajiv Gandhi, the more so as the war in the Gulf has to some extent manufactured a rapprochement between the INC (I) and both Communist Parties which used to oppose the Congress.

Sergei Irodov,
our own correspondent
DELHI



Eyes and ears in orbit over Iraq

Baghdad's attempts to conceal its weapons from US satellites is the subject of a talk between our correspondent and an expert of the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI)

New Times. In its previous issue, our magazine quoted *The Washington Times* which, referring to reliable sources, reported that Soviet military experts remained in Iraq to help it conceal its weapons and military installations from the all-seeing eyes of US spy satellites. Our reporters in Moscow applied to the armed forces staff and the intelligence service for an explanation. The Soviet authorities concerned flatly refuted the allegations of the US press. Would you comment on these reports?

SIPRI. Reports of this kind are extremely dubious. Of course, Iraqis have learned a great deal from Soviet military advisers who probably also taught them methods of camouflage, though methods of counteracting space intelligence were hardly studied. It will be recalled that for many years Iraqis fought against Iran, which does not have satellites.

Incidentally, in those years the US provided Baghdad with satellite information about the armed forces of Iran. True, Washington did not send space photos to Baghdad, because they are considered top secret. However, the Iraqis could probably get an idea of the technical possibilities of US satellites and are now trying to mislead them.

NT. How are they doing that, how can satellite reconnaissance be counteracted?

SIPRI. It is the most secret information, and therefore I can say only what I know. Please don't mention my name so that I may not be accused of mistakes and inaccuracies.

The Iraqis must conceal their real forces and losses from the enemy and create a wrong impression of the deployment of their troops and the effectiveness of air strikes by the US and its allies. For this purpose they create sham airfields, missile launching sites and anti-aircraft guns, put up plywood planes and inflated tanks, unwind rolls of sham landing and take-off runs, draw "shell-holes" on unharmed airfields, transmit misinforming radio messages from nonexistent headquarters, and simulate radar radiation. Dummy

trenches, bunkers and dumps have been built in the desert.

The real positions and weapons are dug in the sand, covered with camouflage nets, and concealed in residential districts or disguised as civilian installations. Some forms of camouflage are simple and effective. For instance, a heavy truck with a Scud missile can be easily transformed into a petrol tanker.

NT. Perhaps the Iraqis' fear of the orbiting US eyes and ears is exaggerated. What American satellites are now in orbit?

SIPRI. The United States has a vast space reconnaissance potential to spy on the Soviet Union. Part of the reconnaissance satellites (true, an unknown number) have been retargeted on Iraq. Ten to twelve satellites can be used to some degree.

The most perfect of them are called Keyhole. Two or three KH-12 photographic reconnaissance satellites, launched recently, and two or three ageing KH-11 satellites are evidently in orbit now. A vehicle of this type, weighing up to five tons, has a fuel reserve for changing its orbit to fly over the necessary area and for "diving" to photograph an important object from a lower altitude. The resolution of a KH-12 satellite is 10 to 15 cm. This means that each point on a photograph taken by it is equivalent to at least 10x10 cm square on the terrain.

NT. What does it mean in practice? Anonymous sources from the US intelligence service assert that Keyholes can record the licence plates of Kremlin limousines.

SIPRI. A KH-12 satellite can at best determine whether a car has a licence plate. However, the atmosphere and the law of optics do not allow it to "read" the letters and figures on it.

Satellites can help to distinguish a tank from a truck and sometimes even determine the type of a tank, and to see a soldier in the desert provided the weather is favourable. The best photos are taken in broad daylight, when there

are no clouds. The point is that the cameras of a satellite or, more exactly, an array of pixels (a "grid" consisting of many mini-cameras), use natural lighting and, as far as is known, have only a limited capacity to get a picture in infra-red rays (that is, after sunset - A.P.).

NT. Let's assume that a reconnaissance satellite takes a "picture". It must be transmitted, processed and interpreted until it finally gets to its "consumer" - a bomber pilot. But during this time the Iraqis will be able to transfer the detected targets to another place.

SIPRI. It is believed that satellites can process photos quicker than they can transmit them by computer to earth. Here lies the first bottleneck in the system. Then electronic computers "digest" photos and they get into the hands of specialists who analyze "dots" and "dashes". The skilled personnel is not numerous and its physical capabilities are limited. This is the second problem. One analyst disclosed that the system allows the specialists to put the most interesting "pictures" on the US President's desk within an hour after a KH-12 satellite flies over a target. This is of course an exceptional case. In the usual situation, I think, hours pass before, on the basis of the information received from a satellite, an American pilot is assigned a concrete task for an operational mission. In the meantime the detected target can be moved to another location.

NT. Air reconnaissance helps to obtain information quicker and of a better quality, doesn't it?

SIPRI. It is certainly easier for a reconnaissance plane to "read" the licence plates of motor vehicles. Its sensors usually switch on cameras operating in various ranges, infra-red pickups, metal detectors and radars. A reconnaissance plane can hardly be misled by a wooden dummy. Detecting a real target for an attack, it directly transmits the data to a bomber. Air reconnaissance now plays the main operation and tactical role in the Persian Gulf. However, it has its weak points. It is very difficult to detect Scud launchers, which is of prime importance today. In addition, the pilot of an unarmed reconnaissance plane following a preset route is risking his life. There are also drones. But they are intended only for flights over the front lines.

Before the war against Iraq, the allies could not use reconnaissance planes on a wide scale. That is why satellites played a noticeable part in drawing up



Iraqis manage to deceive the enemy by putting up decoy tanks. Such "tanks" can be bought in advance, in particular

Photo from the magazine L'Express (Paris)

a plan of military operations by gathering strategic information.

NT. How do Americans spot Scud launchers and direct aircraft to them?

SIPRI. Two of the five DSP (defence support programme) satellites "hang" over the Indian Ocean. Their task is to give an early warning of a Soviet nuclear missile attack from the Baikonur cosmodrome and from southern regions of the USSR. In times of peace they record the fiery trails of launched missiles, whether exercise intercontinental ballistic missiles or rockets used for civil purposes.

The infra-red telescopes of DSP satellites, put into a geostationary orbit at an altitude of 40,000 km, record the 30-second flame of launched Scud missiles and instantly transmit information to the crews of Patriot anti-aircraft sites which destroy Iraqi warheads. Fighter-bombers are simultaneously dispatched to wipe out the launcher.

NT. What other US space "trump cards" can be mentioned?

SIPRI. A Lacrosse imaging radar satellite was launched recently. It was designed to monitor fulfilment of the agreements on arms reduction in Europe. Its radar spots and partly classifies military equipment and weapons. The resolution of the radar is about one metre. It is not known therefore how exactly the Lacrosse can distinguish, say, a truck from a tank. However, it can effectively spot the movement of combat vehicles on a large scale, the redeployment of troops, exercises, and preparations for an attack. A valuable quality of the satellite

is to "see" through clouds and night which are often used as a cover for operations of this kind.

NT. If there are satellites which "peep through keyholes" there must be satellites which "eavesdrop."

SIPRI. Electronic reconnaissance from space is highly effective, because it is very convenient to detect signals from "above." The United States now has three modern Magnum satellites in geostationary orbits. Each of these electronic intelligence satellites, with the aid of their 100-metre-long aerials, "listens" to a sector of the globe. True, a Magnum satellite is not very large (weighing about one ton), because powerful carriers are needed to put a vehicle in a high orbit. However, the electronic computers of the control centre help it to "sift" through radio noise, selecting only the information needed. It is alleged that previously computers were programmed to search for key words in Russian, and now they have been regeared to pick out Arabic words.

NT. Does it mean that each order of Saddam Hussein is instantly overheard?

SIPRI. I do not know how widely Iraqis use codes and cyphers. However, messengers can be used to communicate top-secret orders. It is a reliable, though not very prompt communication. Theoretically, a Magnum satellite hears almost everything. But in fact it is impossible to follow everything. That is why if the Iraqis simulate activity in one area a satellite will be busy with the wrong area and will miss

The United States has two of three more electronic reconnaissance satellites in orbit. Theoretically, they can be re-targeted to spy on Iraq, but they were launched long ago and their technical capacities are not known to me.

NT. It is to be supposed that, with the war going on 500 km away from its southern borders, the Soviet Union does not remain blind and deaf. Has the USSR increased its space activity?

SIPRI. A day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Soviet Union launched a satellite to take photos of the region of the conflict from a low orbit. Such reconnaissance satellites replace one another, staying in orbit for eight weeks. (It will be recalled that Keyhole satellites operate for years.) Flying over the territory of the USSR, they regularly fire capsules with film in the preset zone.

Later on a larger, modern reconnaissance satellite was launched in the Soviet Union. Its parameters are close to those of KH-12 satellite.

The USSR has now three generations of orbital photo reconnaissance satellites. Some of them transmit information directly to the computers of the flight control centre. This allows the centre to redirect the sensors of these satellites to the necessary targets. However, it remains a secret as to what extent the numerous Soviet satellites of other types are watching the war in the Persian Gulf. I am sure that the half-million-strong US armed force attracts the close attention of the Soviet military.

The Soviet Union and the United States rarely share their space reconnaissance data with other countries, but perhaps they exchange such information now and then.

SIPRI. Both countries keep a lid on satellite data and even information about their reconnaissance satellites. Moscow and Washington have to keep vigilant watch on each other and on international conflicts. That is why "gifts" of this kind to other countries, even allies, are an exception, not a rule. Only some information of space reconnaissance is passed on to other countries. The bulk of information gathered by orbiting eyes and ears is kept secret in the US and Soviet repositories.

I doubt whether any exchange of information between the USSR and the USA is possible in general, even during the war in the Persian Gulf. The world has not yet been turned around.

Alexander Polyukhov
STOCKHOLM

The top-secret "Protocol of the Meeting of the Party and Government Delegations of Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the USSR," done in only five copies, has been kept well away from the public eye for twenty-three years (the meeting in question took place in Moscow on August 24-26, 1968). Recently one of these five numbered copies has been found in Warsaw and handed over by the Polish side to the Procurator's Office of the CSFR. The top Party and government leaders of the five countries which suppressed Czechoslovakia's attempt to build "socialism with a human face" were pretty certain that their confidential pronouncements would never be made public. And, of course, neither Zhivkov and Velchev, who represented Bulgaria, nor Ulbricht, Stoph and Honecker, who had arrived from the GDR, nor the Polish leaders Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz and Kłiszko, nor Kadar, Fock and Komocsin of Hungary, to speak nothing of our own Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin, could imagine what Europe would be like in 1991 or how their role would be assessed by history. The text of the protocol, which we reprint from the newspaper *Lidové noviny* (CSFR) is convincing evidence of that.

This text may look doubtful in places. Inaccuracies are inevitable in double translation. In any case, this is a document which historians ought to give a serious study. All the more so that the existence of the Russian original cannot be ruled out...

Inna Rudenko,
our own correspondent
PRAGUE

Murder will out

PROTOCOL

The first meeting

The first meeting took place at the CPSU building on August 24 and lasted from 10.00 to 11.45 a.m.

Comrade Brezhnev:

The purpose of our meeting is known.

I should like to outline the most crucial questions. Our joint forces have fulfilled the task assigned to them. They have taken Czechoslovakia even earlier than planned. As a matter of fact, this has been done without any shots being fired and without any loss of human life.

Troops are just troops, however, they have taken all the points, but they do not do any political work. This is a weak spot because the counter-revolutionaries are well-organized, have secret radio stations (some of them have been detected, it is true), printing presses and so on. A party congress has been held, illegally in fact, without the Central Committee Presidium members and some other delegates attending.

Hostile forces do not discontinue their activity for a minute. Several arms depots have been detected, one of them, incidentally, in the Ministry of Agriculture*. Even machine guns were found in

*Brezhnev had obviously been misinformed: the "arms depots" in question belonged to the People's Militia, not to "hostile forces" (Ed.)

places. Contrary to expectations, our troops have not put hostile forces to flight, their forces remain and are still at it. The positive members of the government have found refuge in the Soviet Embassy and have no chance to do active work.

Under the circumstances, Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Kriegel and Spacek have been interned in the USSR. Dubcek and Cernik are in one place, and the rest - in Moscow.

The army took the country practically without a single shot fired, but could not make its way at once to the radio and television building because it was obstructed by a large crowd of people which it would have had to shoot at in order to make progress. Finally, the troops somehow managed to take that building without shooting. In the course of various actions, however, casualties could not be avoided. Our army has already lost 14 in killed and dozens in wounded**. There are a few Czech casualties as well. By that time, no attempts had been made to organize mass demonstrations, but small ones did take place.

Our comrades report from Prague that calm reigns there, but protests and propaganda against the presence of our troops do not cease. Comrades Svestka and Barbirek, now in our Embassy,

**There were much more casualties, caused not by any "resistance" on the part of the Czechoslovak side, but by accidents connected with the movement of the enormous mass of troops (Ed.)

**How coups are staged.
August, 1968:
a look behind the scenes**





admitted that hadn't our troops come, Czechoslovakia would have been a bourgeois state already.

Provocations are made. In Bratislava, for instance, our servicemen were shot at from windows. But these are separate incidents. The workers and workers' militia take no part in any actions against us. The Czechoslovak army does not leave the places of its deployment and even cooperates with some of our units in logistical matters.

Word came last night that President Svoboda wishes to come over so as to start negotiations and a search for ways of solving the problems. He gave to understand that he wanted to find a solution which would be acceptable to all under the present circumstances and which would bring about a situation where our troops would be strewn with flowers on their way out of Czechoslovakia.

(This is rather hard to imagine!)

We have also been informed that Comrade Svoboda will arrive not alone, but with a whole delegation. We held a conference at night and voiced our consent. The composition of the delegation has been communicated to us. It will comprise Alois Indra, Vasil Bilak, Jan Piller (positive), Mar-

tin Dzur (who has behaved himself well so far), Gustav Gusak (commands a big influence in Slovakia), Bohuslav Kucera (a representative of the Socialist Party) and Milan Klusak (Svoboda's son-in-law, working in the Foreign Ministry and has considerable influence on Svoboda).

Indra, Bilak and others advised Svoboda to form a revolutionary government of which he would be the head. The son-in-law recommended that he should not accept, and as a result Svoboda rejected the proposal.

According to Svoboda's wishes, he was given top honours on arrival as befits the president.

At first we had a talk with him, and then with the delegation as a whole. Svoboda agreed and added that the party affairs should be discussed with the delegation. He stated that the only way out of the situation would be to bring the legal government back to power. He demanded that we should give him a chance to talk with Dubcek and Cernik. He did not mention the rest. In accordance with the assurance he made to the nation before his departure, he wanted to return to Prague as early as last night.

We told him that we also wanted to find

a way out of the situation and to have him form a government which would work in the spirit of the decisions reached in Cierna and in Bratislava. Svoboda agreed to that.

Then we talked with all the delegation. We told it that we regarded the congress illegal. We said that we could accept the Cernik government if he admitted that the congress had been illegal, that the present Presidium of the Central Committee could remain if it postponed the Congress till later, and that we did not demand anything except the observance of commitments undertaken in Cierna. The next to speak was Husak whose statement wasn't good. He said that they had not expected troops to be marched into the CSSR, that the act had created a bad impression, that even the Communists in Czechoslovakia did not understand why it happened. He said that the troops had to leave the cities in any case.

Bilak admitted that a counterrevolution was in the making, that the Party had lost control of the mass media - the radio, television and the press.

Today, the Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia was to have taken place. It would certainly have supported the Prague Congress. It seems that Husak

Brezhnev:

We shall not surrender even under the threat of a civil war, but other ways should be sought for



commands a greater influence in Slovakia than Bilak does. Both Husak and Bilak agreed with our arguments that the holding of the congress would be out of place now. We told them to contact Bratislava and to have the congress put off. They complied. With the help of our army we helped them secure a telephone connection. Last night they told the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee in Bratislava to put the congress off a week or two. We do not know whether this will work. The Right could organize the congress behind their back.

As you see, the political situation has become more complicated.

Yesterday we also had talks with Dubcek and Cernik on two occasions and asked them that they:

- should recognize the congress as illegal;

- assume responsibility for the government and the Presidium of the Central Committee should act in accordance with the decisions reached in Cierna and Bratislava. Dubcek took a worse position than Cernik, he couldn't say anything because he did not know what the situation in the country was, etc.

We told them frankly that if things went on like this, bloodshed could ensue, that our troops could not be withdrawn at present.

Cernik was the first to say that he regarded the congress as illegal, that he would uphold this stand even if he had to resign.

Dubcek subscribed to this position but not as resolutely as Cernik had. One could see that Dubcek largely took Cernik's stand into consideration. They said they had to have a chance to talk the others into accepting their position. I do not know whether they spoke in good faith.

At 23.00 Dubcek and Cernik met with Svoboda and with the delegation he led. At first they talked with Svoboda only, and then with the entire delegation. Indra and Bilak later told us they had not been at one. Besides, they wanted to talk to Smrkovsky.

It is important that Svoboda wants to find a solution. It is good that Cernik approaches it in the same way (if he is sincere). Another positive thing is that Husak

has realized that in the situation which has arisen we shall not pull our troops out. It is obvious that they want to find a solution. Svoboda told the nation he would return to Prague by night, but then realized, without any pressure brought on him, that he was obliged to stay in Moscow till today.

In conversation with us Svoboda said he had tried to convince Dubcek to step down. We think this is a naive idea because in today's hysterical atmosphere they will make a still worse man First Secretary. In any case, it will be neither Indra, nor Bilak, nor anyone of their kind.

Yesterday we agreed that further negotiations with Svoboda would be continued today at 11.00 a.m. (the current meeting of "The Five" has postponed them till 12.00). Dubcek and Cernik are likely to take part in the negotiations. It has been suggested that Dubcek should emplane for Prague today on his own, and that a communiqué published to the effect that the talks would continue and that Dubcek and Cernik take part in them. It is necessary to take into account the hard position which Svoboda has found himself in — he has to do something. This is the matter of including Dubcek and Cernik in the delegation. This is our option which we consider acceptable.

They would like Svoboda to return along with Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky. That, however, would amount to the return of the winner astride a white steed, which we cannot accept.

Zhivkov: Won't the reports on the talks with Dubcek and Cernik also be interpreted as success for them?

Brezhnev: But the negotiations have to be conducted, anyway!

If the delegation accepts our proposals, then they will go home all together. As a matter of fact, we can bring to Moscow the other comrades now in our Embassy in Prague (Kolder, Svestka, Lenart, Barbirek and others). In this case, however, there would be negotiations with the old Presidium of the Central Committee and, consequently, it would amount to the non-recognition of the new Presidium. In the end, this would be not so bad, after all.

Ulbricht: But then all will go back under Dubcek's leadership. However, it is necessary to adopt some decision, considering mass hysteria there.

Brezhnev: Please understand our position today: we do not intend to beat a retreat a step in the face of counterrevolution and to allow to seize Czechoslovakia. Even if that would mean losses to us and if the counterrevolutionaries open fire, like they had in Hungary, we shall not retreat! Please get us right — we shall not budge an inch from our decisions. But the situation is a hard one, chiefly in Prague, and also in

Podgorny:

The healthy forces there have taken refuge in the USSR Embassy and are afraid to act



Bratislava. There is no word from other places.

We suggest that your stay in Moscow so that we could take collective decisions with the changing situation taken into account.

Today we have a better contact with our Embassy in Prague. Our comrades recommend that the new government be called the "government of national unity." But this is not of decisive importance. Comrades also suggest that Svoboda should return alone, and that Moscow talks should continue. They are of the opinion that the current situation will last for no more than one or two days and that it is necessary to find a solution.

Here is the text of the telegram I have just received:

The situation in our country is getting worse from day to day. The Right are getting increasingly active. The country can no longer be without the government, otherwise mass disturbances may occur. The best thing would be for Svoboda to form the "national unity" government with Cernik in it. If no deal can be made with Dubcek, let Indra head the Central Committee.

(Brezhnev: This is unrealistic!) Dubcek must agree that the congress has been illegal — this is important. If he admits this, may Indra become second secretary. Then it will be possible to replace Dubcek **(Brezhnev:** Easier written than done!)

If Cernik stays in the government, this will ease things off. Then it will be possible to bring in the Czechoslovak army to maintain law and order.

If an agreement is reached with Dubcek and Cernik, Bilak could return to Slovakia. This would favour normalization.

The most important thing is that the situation should not remain as it is now — without the government! It would be good if Svoboda returned to Prague today, and if this is impossible owing to the negotiations, then he should address the nation.

Gomulka:

We have only the territory of Czechoslovakia, but not the support from either the majority of the nation, or of the army



Podgorny: They will not agree to this being published here in Moscow!

Gomulka: But they are in Moscow, after all. And, after all, the call for calm can be signed by all, including Dubcek and Cernik. They should be told that if they fail to do that, the army will be instructed to act accordingly to maintain order.

As a matter of fact there is no party in Czechoslovakia, there are only individual Communists. The party has transformed into a socialist democratic party which is in cahoots with the counterrevolutionaries. Therein lies the complexity of the situation.

The reactionary forces have enlisted the cooperation of all their allies. The Free Europe radio station has announced it has curtailed its Polish programmes because all are preoccupied with Czechoslovakia.

The actual correlation of forces in Europe has changed already. Czechoslovakia is actually outside the Warsaw Treaty, and the same is true of the Czechoslovak army. We have only the territory of Czechoslovakia, but not the support from either the majority of the nation, of the Party, or of the army. Counterrevolutionaries, led by the intellectuals, are actually in control there. Most people are passive. The Communists keep a low profile for fear of their heads being chopped off. From this point of view, the situation there is worse than it was in Hungary in 1956.

The reactionaries have gained new experience, they now know that counterrevolution can exist in the Soviet troops' presence as well. What will happen next? They will attack the GDR, Poland and other countries of our alliance. In all probability, the leaders of counterrevolution will arrive at precisely such views.

When we decided to send troops a week ago, we did not even think that the situation in Czechoslovakia was as bad as that. By now it has become clear that things are really bad!

It is necessary to organize a session of the CPCz Central Committee somewhere while the latter still exists. We should attend that session, all of us, and discuss all the problems frankly. We must tell them that we shall not pull the troops out because we do not want to expose our left flank.

Can we hold joint talks here with the Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee in full session?

We should draw up a good address to the workers' party of Czechoslovakia.

(Kosygin: A statement by our government has been drafted and is being

Zemsky:

This ought to be a workers' and peasants' government without Dubcek



I do not mean that, the statement I am speaking of should be written in an entirely different way.

The Czechoslovak people do not realize what has happened after Bratislava. We have not explained this to them. Why? We must do that so that all should know what's going on. We had also to explain that to our own Party as we did in the letter to the Party organizations. This is a matter of principle.

As to other circumstances, we shall discuss them later.

Ulbricht: We must take into account the fact that the Czechoslovak people have not been informed about the current state of affairs, about the Cierna decisions, and about Dubcek and others having failed to fulfil them. We have explained that to our people in the open, but the Czechs do not know about that. Dubcek kept them in the dark. Counterrevolution cashes in on that.

If Svoboda goes back, the communiqué should not say that negotiations continue. This would mean that we are beginning to make concessions. They will start demanding Dubcek and the others back.

First of all, it is necessary not only to appeal for calm, but also to call upon the working class and the revolutionary forces to challenge counterrevolution. If Czechs sign this appeal, this will be fine; if not, then we shall sign it.

The proposal that the "national unity" government be formed has been worded in the spirit of Masaryk. The national slogan should be linked with the working class. A workers' and peasants' government should be formed. Otherwise, nationalists will take advantage of the situation. It is necessary to stir Czechoslovakia healthy forces to action.

We cannot encourage efforts to bring Dubcek back because he has cheated us. We might start negotiations with the entire leadership, but we must not say that the negotiations continue, but mention no names.

Gomulka: The statement should be signed by Svoboda, Cernik and Dzur, but

Kadar: Let Svoboda go home. If negotiations continue, there is no need to mention names in the communiqué.

Brezhnev: Svoboda will accept the statement if it mentions Dubcek and Cernik.

Kadar: We cannot accept that.

Brezhnev: We have interned them, but we've got to do something about them.

Gomulka: Just a few words about certain questions. If Svoboda returns alone, and if a communiqué is published to the effect that negotiations continue, that would mean that he has not achieved anything himself. As a result, he will lose face. If the communiqué mentions Dubcek and Cernik, then the counterrevolutionaries will press for their return to Prague.

(Brezhnev: We think that in this case the counterrevolutionaries will come out against Dubcek).

It is necessary to get rid of illusions: either we go further, or we surrender. If we reject surrender, then how to act is a matter of tactics. Now we can no longer do without a battle. If we don't tell the troops what to do to the counterrevolutionaries, they will be at a loss what to do. The army should be given instructions as to how to deal with the counterrevolutionaries.

What Chervonenko writes — we cannot do without leadership any longer — is true.

After Svoboda's departure, it is necessary to indicate in the communiqué that negotiations will be continued when the country calms down. If not, then the army will be instructed to act accordingly.

Brezhnev: We could write there that calm in the country will be conducive to further negotiations.

Gomulka: No! Svoboda should recommend that the nation should calm down.

Podgorny: He has already done that, but the country is still in turmoil.

Gomulka: The question remains: do we want to surrender, or don't we? If Dubcek and Cernik return now, the country's reactionaries will press further on. The Czechs should edit on their own the appeal to the people for calm.

not by Dubcek who is not a member of government.

Zhivkov: We agree with Brezhnev that the situation is extremely grave. Let us be realists! At present, confrontation with counterrevolution is already an inevitability, disregarding the fact, whether Dubcek takes part in negotiations or not.

The most important thing is that we shall not retreat because this would mean a defeat for us. Czechoslovakia is threatened with a civil war. If any government appears there, this will simplify the situation. This ought to be a workers' and peasants' government without Dubcek, because any other government would encourage counterrevolution. Clashes are unavoidable, especially in Prague and other cities. There must be healthy forces there, too: after all, the incoming troops were also given a good reception.

(Brezhnev: Now it's worse!)

But we are not doing anything. We must assume the offensive lest things should get worse. It is necessary to go all out to smash counterrevolution. We have to wipe out the reactionary gangs in Prague, Bratislava and other cities.

We should start with forming a government. There is no other way out. If it comes to a civil war, the Czechoslovak army will stir into motion.

Brezhnev: The National Assembly, ready to appeal to the United Nations any moment, is now in session there.

Gomulka: Speaking of Dubcek, I have no illusions about him, but we must use him. He must sign something that would be unacceptable to counterrevolution. This will compromise him and set them at loggerheads.

Kadar: It is important that Svoboda should return to Prague and that a communiqué is issued to the effect that negotiations have taken place and that now they continue with the remainder of the delegation. Preferably, no mention of names should be made. In conclusion, we should call on the people to calm down and thus facilitate progress of further negotiations.

Brezhnev: We agree to that, but Svoboda presses for Dubcek and Cemik being mentioned there. He claims this will ease off tensions in the country.

Gomulka: On the contrary! Can we write that Svoboda has met with Dubcek and Cemik and that they are making a joint appeal to the nation?

Brezhnev: They will sign no appeal in Moscow.

Gomulka: Then let us do what Comrade Kadar suggests.

Brezhnev: But Svoboda insists on the inclusion of Dubcek and Cemik.

Kosygin: They will not sign anything of the sort here in Moscow because Dubcek realizes that this would compromise him. He knows this as well as we do.

Ulbricht:

If Czechs sign this appeal, this will be fine; if not, then we shall sign it



Podgorny: Naturally! None of us would sign anything of the sort, neither I, nor you, Comrade Gomulka. Anyone would say he has been compelled to sign in Moscow.

The healthy Czechoslovak comrades think that if Dubcek and Cemik admit the congress has been illegal, etc., this will give the Right a sufficient pretext to attack them.

Brezhnev: Why not accept Gomulka's suggestion that the CPCz Central Committee should gather in full session in a few days and we all should attend it?

I do not quite agree with Gomulka in that the Party no longer exists in Czechoslovakia. In spite of all, the masses have not taken to the streets, there are no strikes, and the factories are quiet, on the whole. This means that Party organizations are at work there.

What is true, however, is that there is no party guidance.

Ulbricht: It is necessary to address the Party and to mobilize it.

Podgorny: Unless the full session of the Central Committee recognizes the Congress as illegal, we shall not achieve anything. This is what we should begin with.

Kosygin: The situation is such that none of the healthy forces — members of the leadership — wishes to join the government. Svoboda said that if he headed the government now he would be accused of high treason. He says he'd rather resign or even blow his brains out.

Dzur says that he has ordered the Czechoslovak People's Army to remain passive on the instructions of Svoboda and the CPCz Central Committee, Dubcek included. At the moment when the troops marched in, the Presidium of the Central Committee was in progress. They addressed Svoboda, and a joint decision was adopted on issuing such an order.

Brezhnev: Surrender is out of the question. Svoboda should return to Czechoslovakia, to Prague, and the statement should be published, preferably without Dubcek's and Cemik's names mentioned; however, they should be mentioned in the communiqué about the negotiations.

Zhivkov: It is necessary to say that Dubcek and Cemik have not carried out their commitments.

Brezhnev: This will only outrage Dubcek and Cemik, and we shall lose them irrevocably.

Podgorny: The healthy forces there have taken refuge in the USSR Embassy and are afraid to act. The Party does exist, but cannot work under the circumstances.

Still, the Czech people are informed: we have issued thousands of pamphlets and leaflets.

Gomulka: Svoboda and the delegation present here ought to address the nation.

Podgorny: Svoboda insists that Dubcek and Cemik be mentioned in the communiqué. This could be useful, because they are alleged to have been arrested and interned. If their names are mentioned, this will calm down the healthy forces as well.

Ulbricht: This would amount to a public admission of the fact that the delegation is led by Dubcek. This would mean support for nationalists.

Podgorny: I suggest the solution for the problem; Comrade Ulbricht's proposal does not solve it. A simple explanation will not do here.

Inevitable though a civil war seems, it can be avoided. We must seek ways to do that.

Gomulka: Dubcek and Cemik have not really taken part in the talks, so why mention them in the communiqué? I think we'd rather not write that Svoboda has met with them.

Brezhnev: But Svoboda will not agree to that.

We shall not surrender even under the threat of a civil war, but other ways should be sought for.

I have just received a coded message saying that a change for the better has taken place, following the talks Bilak and Husak had last night with five members of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Slovakia. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia unanimously decided to prevent the convocation of a Party congress, to postpone it. All the committees were informed about the decision right away lest the delegates should leave their localities. Those in Bratislava will be sent to factories to call for calm there. Three hundred good students (Husak's son among them) were delegated to work with young people.

Last night a radio station was put into action with the help of our soldiers; the station has been put at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia.

A microphone has been installed in the Central Committee building.

Illegal radio stations are being closed down. Under no circumstances will the publication of newspapers carrying anti-Soviet articles be allowed. (End of coded message.)

Well, comrades, as you see there are still chances.

(To be concluded in the next issue)

Kalashnikov guns sold in bulk

How Soviet arms made their way to Croatia without Moscow's knowledge

The affair reads like a detective story. On one autumn day last year a car drove up to the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier. Its passengers were former foreign minister Zdravko Mrcic and present Defence Minister Martin Spegelj of the Croatian government.

The ministers arrived in the neighbouring country incognito, and with a special mission, namely, to reach agreement with Hungarian officials concerning the smuggling of arms needed to raise armed forces in Croatia.

The talks were concluded successfully, and by October several vans loaded with boxes crossed the Hungarian-Yugoslav border. They carried Kalashnikovs and ammunition for them. The load was destined for the Zagreb-based firm Astra. In fact, the arms were intended for special para-military units being formed in Croatia.

The news of illegal arms supplies to Croatia hit Belgrade like a bomb-shell. As more information became known, new questions arose.

First, how could several vans loaded

with arms cross the border without being recorded in a single document? Was this possible? The Yugoslav customs department replied that it was. The point is that at most Yugoslav frontier posts customs inspectors work only during the day, and at night their work is done by employees of republican Ministries of the Interior. That is why with the approval of authorities concerned, goods can easily be smuggled into any republic at night.

There is another urgent question, 'one of the responsibility of those who master-minded, directed and carried out this operation. First of all, this concerns Croatia's Defence Minister Martin Spegelj and Foreign Minister Josip Boljkovac, who directly organized the smuggling of arms. Demands are being made that they be arrested or at least dismissed from office. However, the leadership of Croatia unequivocally took the ministers under its protection. The head of the republic, Franjo Tudjman, said that "Spegelj carried out the decision of the Croatian government and was answerable only to it."

Since arms were delivered from another country, the scandal became an international one. Belgrade sternly expressed its displeasure to the Hungarian leadership with the complicity of Hungarian government bodies in supplying arms to "one of the Yugoslav republics without the knowledge of the central authorities of the country."

Hungary's reaction was rather contradictory. At first, its foreign minister Geza Jeszenszky flatly denied any government involvement in the delivery of guns, saying that "it does not necessarily know about the selling of arms to Yugoslavia by an appropriate firm." However, the Foreign Minister's statement was soon refuted by the director of the Hungarian enterprise Technika, which engages in arms deliveries to other countries. The director revealed that the order for the selling of 30,000 guns of Croatia came from the Defence Ministry and that permission to taking them out of the country was given by the Ministry of International Economic Ties. So the government did know about the affair.

The situation was discussed in the Hungarian parliament in the presence of all government leaders. The parliament admitted that the selling of arms was a wrong decision caused by a neglect of official duty. Such a conclusion did not satisfy the opposition, which called for an independent parliamentary inquiry. It appears that Belgrade has found many ambiguous points in the explanation. That is why it is too early to say that the arms sale case is over. In addition, reports of new illegal deliveries of arms to the country have appeared in the Yugoslav press.

There is one more aspect to the affair. The notorious Zagreb firm Astra is known to have tried to buy arms in several countries, the Soviet Union included. In his letter to appropriate Soviet ministries Franjo Greguric, director of the firm and now deputy chairman of the Croatian government, expressed a readiness to buy 20,000 Kalashnikov guns and four million rounds "for delivery to countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America." The firm gave guarantees that these arms would not be used in "hot spots." To Moscow's credit it should be noted that the offer was not accepted. Nevertheless, Kalashnikov guns came to be in Croatia, now one of the "hot spots" in Europe. The firm, however, is still a member of the Warsaw Treaty and an ally of the Soviet Union and which of course was not the country that invented the AK-47.

Gennadiy Sidorov

Drawing by Victor Bogorad



THIRD BASKET

REFLECTIONS

Science is dead. Long live science!

Larisa Lisyutkina

Kindergartens and schools, colleges and the political education system did not only train and instruct us, the citizens of formerly socialist countries, but – practically throughout our lives, from the cradle to the grave – inculcated a **scientific world outlook** in us. Let me leave aside the fact that our tutors and teachers have, not infrequently, been ignorant and corrupt. This fact merits special discussion. I suggest we rather try and find an answer to the question: what is a scientific world outlook? In their everyday life, most people go by their life experience and plain common sense. Science is practiced by professionals while the ordinary man in the street deals with his problems empirically. What do scientists and us ordinary mortals have in common?

How to explain socialism

The assertion that all people – or classes, at least – have to master a scientific world outlook, i.e., to be guided by scientific knowledge in their day-to-day activity, is absurd. In the world outlook of private individuals, communities or whole cultures, science has always been outweighed by religion and philosophy, not to mention common sense. It was only in modern times that there has emerged the idea of society as a whole, as well as specialists, being able to construct a scientific picture of the world. Marxist philosophy goes even further than that and claims it can mould society on scientific lines, like a "social designer" of sorts. Whereas in traditional societies the right to power was based on the authority of religion, and in modern democratic countries – on the will of the people, the political regimes of socialist countries claimed – for the first time ever in the history of mankind – a strictly scientific character of their policy and of public life in general. Every means was used to initiate citizens in the mysteries of science – right down to "re-educating" the less politically consci-

ous and the more intransigent of them in mental clinics.

How are the interrelationships between science and mass consciousness developing in actual fact? The late 20th century offers the public as a whole unheard-of opportunities to acquire scientific knowledge: the mass communication media, the public education system, new global means of transportation and freedom of international movement.

Nevertheless, scientific knowledge almost never reaches the public, the man in the street, in its pure form. Between science and the public mind there emerges an intermediary called ideology. By its very nature, scientific knowledge is outside politics. Within the framework of ideology there take place selection, censorship, a shifting of emphases – in other words, the formation of such **versions** of scientific theories which best suit the interests of this or that social group professing the given ideology. Naturally, the knowledge thus deformed has little to do with its original source – science. Ideology turns it into a means to serve political ends. As a result of political manipulations, heinous crimes against humanity have been committed in the 20th century in the name of science. As we all know, class theory (Marxism) and race theory (Nazism) insisted on a strictly scientific character of their postulates which called off the religious commandment of "Thou shalt not kill."

Actually, any scientist worthy of the name, and any honest politician, realizes full well that there can be no such thing as a "scientifically substantiated" social system or political system. Society and science work on entirely different principles. Scientific theories are worked out by experts, while social processes depend for their efficacy – as we know from history – upon a fair representation of interests and an adequate expression of the broad masses' will. Experts and the masses may (or rather have to) be divided on the objectives of social progress and on the optimum ways of achieving these objectives.

New thinking as we see it

Science can do a great deal, but not all. For

For some, science is a caste of eggheads. For others, it is a community of time-servers catering to the needs of the powers-that-be. Nevertheless, all of us agree that science is our only hope...



Drawing by Vladimir Stepanov

Instance, the cultural and humanistic values which determine, in the final analysis, individual and collective objectives in the history of mankind, are irrational in principle and cannot be scientifically substantiated. Science can be applied to production planning within the framework of an industry or a specific project. It has proved impossible, however, to model such conceptual notions as "socio-economic formation," "mode of production," "the objective of historical progress"... By trying to do that we mystify the very notion of science, its role and functions in society. Such attempts have provided the nutritive medium for Lysenkovism, for technocratic and totalitarian utopias. We shall never find our way out of the current crisis if we proceed from the premise that in the past our leaders and our vanguard had wrong ideas about certain "real," "genuine" theoretical principles, that they misunderstood or distorted something — hence the failure to build a society based on "scientific principles."

It would be naive to hope that science as such is capable of pulling our society out of crisis by means of some ethereal "new thinking." Public opinion polls have revealed that people are bewildered, confused, that their minds are a mess of different, often contradictory notions, images, principles and ideas. Most of the calls and formulae issued by our political reformers and falling into the class of "new thinking" fail to catch on; they do not correlate in any way with the personal experience of third- or even fourth-generation citizens of a totalitarian state. What does the "market economy" mean to a resident of Krivoi Rog or Pavlodar? Or "democracy"? Or "pluralism"? We know from our school history textbooks that during the December 1825 uprising the officers' calls "For the constitution! For the constitution!" were mistaken by private soldiers as an appeal for enthroning the wife of crown prince Constantine. In our society, however, this is a most accurate picture of how the ideal

of scientific socialism, imposed from above, was interpreted at the grass-roots level in early 20th-century Russia. Historians and sociologists know that any reforms and transformations, any utopian project are finally reduced to what the average man in the street makes of them.

Far from narrowing down, the gap between science and the general public has been steadily broadening in the 20th century; with science becoming inevitably isolated and elitized. The magnitude, depth and specialization of scientific knowledge have grown to such an extent that no individual, however brilliant, is capable of digesting all the information in his particular line of research, let alone the entire body of scientific knowledge accumulated to date. The titans of the Renaissance are unthinkable today. As a matter of fact, an individual's functions in the sphere of science have changed greatly. The need for memorizing large amounts of information has practically obviated itself. This quantitative function has been taken over by computers. This leaves the scientist free to augment knowledge qualitatively, i.e., to engage in forms of activity which call for creative intuition, inspiration, offbeat thinking.

Today science reaches the general public as a myth, an apocryph, science fiction. It appears as two-faced Janus: either as an absolute destroyer, or as a saviour of mankind. The Apocalypse or the Golden Age — such are the two myths, the poles between which the man in the street, with his fear of and veneration for modern science is crucified.

The paradox is that both destructive and constructive potentials are indeed inherent in modern science. But the mechanisms which trigger these potentials into action lie outside science proper. As already indicated, the motives behind people's real social behaviour have little, if anything, to do with the process of scientific cognition. These motives are determined by value criteria rooted in cultural traditions and in the religious notions of good and evil far removed from scientific knowledge.

"Upper crust,"

"lower classes" —

and "rulers"

One of the most difficult questions to resolve is that of science's and scientists' responsibility for social progress as a whole and for the threat of

Historic decisions have always depended on the "thinking few" or, as the French philosopher André Glucksmann refers to the intellectual elite, the "dominant influence."

Intellectual arrogance and lust for power are characteristic of the right- and left-wing ideological elite alike. The right seek to build their "rational" society from above, and the left - with the support from the lower classes. All this is far from unquestionable. The lower classes, as we know, are sometimes "unwilling." The "dominant influence" does not care a fig for that. For them, the point of departure is neither the "upper crust" nor the "lower classes," but they themselves and their science.

Apart from elitarian manipulations, modern science displays another characteristic tendency which helps preserve the closed circle of self-deception: it stubbornly seeks to avoid the assessment of the moral positions underlying this or that scientific theory.

The intellectuals' privileged position finds its clear-cut reflection in the public mind. Many sociologists (John Galbraith, for instance) say that in the United States suspicion and resentment are aroused not by capitalists or those merely rich. People disapprove, and are wary of intellectuals and anaemic snobs... Apart from the ruling political elite, these people, in Galbraith's opinion, form a new elite, or an "educated caste." Manifesting itself here is a new line of class conflicts and of the class division of society.

It goes without saying that the above does not apply to all intellectuals. What causes the conflict is not knowledge as such but the methods of using knowledge which makes it an instrument of power and of suppressing the differently-minded. The "dominant influence" expresses the striving for power characteristic of other "bosses" in a disciplinary society. Being an intellectual, however, and being the "dominant influence" are two different things. The kindling of anti-intellectualism impairs the sense of solidarity and cooperation in the drive for reforms.

The problem of science's responsibility for social progress in what used to be countries of real socialism requires a special approach to it. There science has compromised itself in the eyes of the public by its collaboration with the totalitarian rule. The phenomenon of Academician Sakharov resisting the system single-handedly has only

emphasized the extent to which his colleagues betrayed the interests of the people. On the other hand, the foundations of science have been shaken by years of persecution and senseless bans. Now we see, to our dismay, that the war declared by the state on genetics, cybernetics, sociology and other "bourgeois pseudo-sciences" has been crowned with victory. The society we live in lies in ruins. It has not a single really operative social mechanism, not a single banner to rally around either in economics, politics or culture. Our economy is an enormous mass of fictitious production because the objects it produces have nothing to do with real human needs. The sociologist V.M. Vilchek referred to our mammoth plants, integrated works and factories as "industrial icons or industrial objects of worship." The political system rested on violence - after violence had eased off, the system collapsed. The humanities produced fictitious knowledge, ideology fought fictitious enemies and implanted fictitious values (such as "proletarian internationalism"). All this collapsed overnight like a house of cards. Now that the country and society are at their "zero hour," Kronid Lyubarsky, a banished compatriot of ours, has reminded us of Thomas Mann's words to the effect that all the books published under Nazism ought to be burnt.

After all the disgrace and humiliation we have gone through, science is still regarded by the nation as its only hope. It is still expected to provide an answer to the question of what is to become of our society in the long run. The King is dead! Long live the King!

If our science is to contribute, in its own way, to resolving the crisis our society is now in the middle of, the members of this society ought to discard one of the deepest-rooted illusions that there exist absolute, final, solely correct decisions guaranteeing universal happiness and well-being. Science and social progress have one important thing in common: both are up against something entirely new, something the only known characteristic of which is resistance. "The alternative to the universal and the ultimate," wrote E.Bloch, "is not the other universal and the other ultimate, but the incomplete which remains revolutionary because it never turns into something rigidly restricted, and is always on its way to what is new and unknown."

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The temple

When it comes
to churches,
atheistic rulers
reach for the detonation fuse

They say that Brezhnev suffered from a severe toothache one day which prompted the General Secretary to refer the majestic ruins of the former Königsberg Cathedral

in Kaliningrad as "a rotten tooth." The verdict was brief and to the point: the ruins were to be razed to the ground because they marred the view. Another rumoured reason for ordering the demolition of the Cathedral was that the island it stood on would make a good parking lot.

How did the local patriots, including those in the city, and regional governing bodies, manage to preserve the pride of the city? Moscow kept pressing for the Cathedral to be torn down. Kaliningrad offered every plausible excuse for putting the matter off: no explosives; no trucks; field engineers haven't arrived yet... They played for time as best they could until the toothache subsided and the whole thing was forgotten. Besides, the fight against the spirit of Prussian militarism had lost much in its intensity by the end of the seventies.

A number of legends are connected with the Cathedral. After the removal of the philosopher Immanuel Kant had been moved to its cemetery, a rumour spread that his sarcophagus was empty. Another rumour has it that the Cathedral is haunted by its founder, Luther von Braunschweig, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order.

"The Vatican did not give the go-ahead for the construction of the Cathedral for almost

seventy years," said Yuri Zabuga. "There must have been too many deviations from the canons of the church. Its design did not provide for the canonical Latin cross, for instance."

Any house of worship is distinguished by its own symbolism and its own philosophy. In Yuri's opinion, the uniqueness of the Cathedral consisted in that it combined two cultures - Christian, which the German Crusaders had brought to the Amber Coast, and pagan, borne by the local Slav tribe of Prussians. Yuri does not rule out that the Cathedral was meant to embody the ancient religious and philosophical teaching known as the Beam of Creation, that the Cathedral was nothing but a model of the Universe.

"In the architectural concept of the Cathedral, the main structural features are based on certain digital regularities," the architect explained. "For instance, the 12-hedral tower rests on a tetrahedral base, although an octohedral one would have been much easier to make. Each facet of the tower has two windows in it, adding up to a total of 24. As you see, the main figure here is 12. In the Beam of Creation it stands for the Sun which pagans worshipped. The figure 24 means "all planets."

Over its 600-year history, the Cathedral catered to both Catholics and Protestants. Yuri Zabuga is of the opinion that Russian Orthodox believers may also perform their religious rites there. He visualizes the re-

it served as in the past, open to all Christian confessions. He recalled the words by Kant which show that the philosopher had attached special importance to the moral law by which he and the stellar sky above him live.

"Now it's time to go back to the ideas of the eucumenical movement," the architect says, "to remove all the barriers separating Catholics, Protestants and Russian Orthodox believers. Something like a eucumenical cathedral is already under construction somewhere in Africa."

This is what the architect thinks. However, the final decision rests with the Church and the believers. A year and a half ago, Yuri Zabuga's project to restore the Cathedral was approved by the citizens of Kaliningrad and by the city authorities. So far so good, but then the eternal question arose: where's the money to come from? The city lacks the \$30 to 40 million required to make the project a reality. German churches are prepared to provide part of the money but fear, not without good reason, that their money will be misappropriated. While the Cathedral belongs to the city authorities it belongs to no one, the Germans say. The sponsors will do the funding on the condition that the Cathedral gets an owner, i.e. that it should be handed over to the religious community, lest some VIP's indisposition should put it, once again, in danger of being demolished.

Konstantin Isakov

Photo from the book *Als Gast in Königsberg*

Refusenik hides in embassy

American lawyer David W. Leopold defends his rights and ours

David W. Leopold works at the prestigious American law firm Weston Hurd and in his spare time is a defender of human rights as a member of the board of directors of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, an organization that has been helping our refuseniks for over twenty years, struggling to see a liberalization in Soviet emigration law. In past times it was high on the list of "subversive anti-Soviet organizations." Now, at 14 Novoslobodskaya Street, there is an office of the Joint Soviet-American Bureau on Human Rights.

David came to Moscow in November. Having acquainted himself with the existing bills on entry and exit from the Soviet Union, he proposed his own. In addition to this work, he is acting as an attorney for Dmitry Berman, a person who has found temporary asylum at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His interview with *New Times* David began by outlining the four sore spots he sees in Soviet emigration legislation.

Secrecy

"First of all, the legislation does not put an end to the problem of refuseniks. Existing bills allow for withholding of the right to emigrate for five years if based on considerations of national security and, additionally, exceptions are also possible in cases when the head of an organization in which the person applying for permission to emigrate worked considers that a five-year delay in granting an exit visa is not sufficient. It is said that this exception is made only in 'extreme cases' in which persons wishing to emigrate have been privy to the most sensitive of materials. But as no such provisions are to be found on the legal books, such delays can be extended both to those who have had such access to secret information as well as to any others applying for permission to emigrate. We submitted our proposed version of the law to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and to the Supreme Soviet commissions, a version which stipulates a maximum delay of five years in granting permission to emigrate. In order to hold a person for five years, the state bears the burden of proof, it must demonstrate that the secrets the person had access to were and continue to be of significance in terms of national security considerations, that a revelation of such secrets could have serious consequences and that the person in question might reveal the secret. Any such arguments put forth by the government could be assessed by an administrative body or a Supreme Court of the republic.

"In principle, this five-year delay is a violation of each person's right to leave his own country freely, but we make an allowance in this case — provided such a delay is accompanied by the proper procedure of presenting evidence and the right of appeal."

"Poor relations"

"The second sore point is related to 'poor

relations.' None of the bills now being considered provides a way for a person wishing to emigrate to settle financial disputes with relatives not emigrating. In the proposed bills there is a clause which states that any citizen who presents his documents to the Visa and Registration Department must also submit legal documents attesting to the fact that there are no persons who have legal claims on him. But what are the specific technicalities of such a clause? Say I am emigrating and you insist that I owe you 1,000 rubles. I am willing to pay the money, but there exists no legal procedure by which I can receive the document I need. I am your hostage and you can keep me locked up as long as you see fit...

"We propose that, as a way of resolving such disputes in which a parent or former spouse has claims on the person planning to emigrate, they make their claim on the plaintiff in court according to place of residence and that the court render its written decision within 30 days. The person wishing to emigrate is obligated to inform his parents and former spouse (if he has children remaining under the age of 18) of his intention to emigrate. If within a 30-day period no legal action has been taken, any claims on the person emigrating are lifted...

"In addition we feel that persons emigrating should be permitted to pay off all their debts or alimony several years in advance. That will exclude any future claims. In my view, agreements as to payment of debts from abroad, which is common practice everywhere, are also possible..."

Military service

"The third point — military — is relatively recent and arose in connection with the latest changes in the bill which state that any male citizen of the Soviet Union between the ages of 16 and 27 must serve two years in the army before he may leave the country. No one disputes the right of your country to maintain an army and conscription. However, such a provision can serve as a hindrance to families wishing to emigrate. If you are under 28 and did not serve in the army you may be stuck in the country for a long time. In addition, the stipulation is so broad that it can be applied even to someone who has already served in the



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

army but who is in the reserves and has not yet reached the age of 28. Our proposal states that only a person currently serving in the army can be denied permission to emigrate. And even in such cases, exceptions are possible, say as in cases of an illness or death of a close relative abroad."

Property

"The fourth and final point regards property. At the present time, those emigrating are allowed to take with them only a bare minimum of items, in spite of the fact that in accordance with international law, an emigrant may take with him everything he has acquired legally. Another aspect to the problem is that of a person leaving the country to take up permanent residence (which is not the same thing as emigration. A person can live abroad, working on contract 5, 6 or even 20 years, and then come back in accordance with the generally accepted right to freely leave one's country and to return to that country) keeping in his possession any property he may own, that is his flat or house. The bills on entry and exit which I have seen allow local Soviets, for example those of Moscow or Leningrad, to limit the quantity of real estate the person may maintain. That is something we do not agree with..."

Vindicated, but not released

David W. Leopold is not engaged only in formulating laws for us, he also acts as a legal attorney for those whose rights have been violated.

"The most serious case I am handling involves 26-year-old Nikolayev-native Dmitry Berman. At the present time, he is hiding out at the Canadian Embassy which has granted him temporary asylum. Berman wants to leave for Israel..."

"The history of the case," David explains, "goes as follows: In 1988 a murder was committed in the city of Nikolayev and that night a police patrol seized Berman, who was standing at a bus stop. From what I know, everything began with a routine check of Berman's identification papers following which he was taken to the police station. There a warrant was issued and the time of his seizure was altered in such a way that Berman could theoretically have committed the murder and had enough time to get to the bus stop.

Despite the fact that Berman had never seen psychiatric help, he was sent to one psychiatric hospital, then to another, then to a third. He was there given injections... He was held for an extended period of time in an isolation cell and in a penal isolation cell. Dmitry was beaten by convicts with the encouragement of the authorities. In the end he signed a confession. A trial was then held and Berman was sentenced to 15 years in



Dmitry Berman awaits a decision to his fate in the Canadian Embassy

prison. It was a closed trial and Berman was not allowed to hire his own attorney...

"Following the pronouncement of the sentence, Berman's relatives turned to Moscow lawyers who submitted an appeal. But the case dragged out... Andrei Sakharov then became interested in Berman's case. Not long before his death, Sakharov requested of two refusniks that they look into the case. In January of 1990 a new trial was held during which it became clear that the actions of the prosecution had been unlawful. Berman was released and the case was handed over to the Nikolayev prosecutor's office. In June of last year, I came to the Soviet Union and, having heard about the Berman case, decided to act as his lawyer abroad. But I did not have enough time to submit an appeal before the court in August concluded that it had no concrete evidence against Berman. At that time, having suffered a year and a half of abuse by his country, he decided to emigrate and he was informed that he had the right to do so.

"When I came again to the Soviet Union in November, I didn't even bother to bring with me the papers I had collected on the Berman case as I was sure he was already residing in Israel. However, it turned out that events had taken a tragic turn... Having gone through all the necessary formalities and having purchased a plane ticket, Berman's family showed up at the Visa and Registration Department for one last time to turn in their passports. At that point Dmitry was informed that he would not be allowed to emigrate and that a case was being prepared against him in court. Then, fearing that he would again be placed in a psychiatric hospital or in an isolation cell, Berman fled to Moscow to the Canadian Embassy..."

New evidence?

"A week after Berman entered the embassy, I contacted the head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of International Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights, Yuri Reshetov. 'Why are

you wasting your time?' he told me over the phone. 'This is a local case. Phone the Nikolayev prosecutor's office.' I believed it but a week later a ministry official announced at a press conference that the state Procurator's Office was handling the Berman case..."

"On February 12, Prosecutor-General Nikolai Trubin said that new evidence had been found implicating Berman in the murder. But what evidence could have turned up three years after the fact? It is obvious that they must have meant that new witnesses had appeared. At the first hearing, two prostitutes gave evidence, prostitutes who stood at a distance from the scene of the crime and who in the dark could not have made out the identity of the murderer. Now it seems they have found someone else..."

"Berman has already been tried and a sentence has been overruled down. His case has been thoroughly investigated by the best Soviet and American lawyers. I am told 'This is a murder case, not a political trial. Why are you interfering in the internal affairs of another country?' I continue to feel that this is a case of human rights violation..."

...Following my conversation with David W. Leopold, I phoned the Canadian Embassy. The person on the phone refused to tell me exactly where Berman was housed and requested that I not attempt to sensationalize the case. "We have good relations with the Soviet authorities," I was told. "And we hope that Berman's case will be decided in accordance with Soviet law..." The Canadian diplomat was not aware that new evidence had been found implicating Berman.

There is no sense in making a sensation of the Berman case as aside from the asylum in the embassy, it is an everyday event. Detention without just cause, fabricated accusations designed to raise the percentage of solved crimes, unprofessionalism and an accusatory way of handling cases on the part of a local court - these are things which, judging from readers' letters, are very common in this country, a state which claims to be one based on the rule of law. This is a disease which must be treated, one which, alas, will be difficult and time-consuming to eliminate. It appears, however, that on the agenda of our legal organs other items figure more prominently. The season's rage is mixed patrolling of the streets. It is interesting to speculate what would have been Berman's fate had the policemen that night three years ago been accompanied by soldiers armed with rifles and bayonets.

Lev Yelin

The World Paper

Accountants pulling the strings

Wizards of markets

Keith Burgess, a good-humored Welshman, is one of thousands of commercial visitors who poured into Moscow last year. The capital, like others in the former Soviet bloc is under siege from Western businessmen anxious to take advantage of perestroika.

Burgess flew in from London where he runs Andersen Consulting, the management consultancy arm of Chicago-based accountants, Arthur Andersen. He left after several days with an unusual brief from

members of the Moscow Soviet: to advise on how the city could improve its patchy distribution of bread to the shops.

Andersen went to work

on the bread situation and now has a team in Moscow putting its recommendations into effect. These range from improving productivity at the bread factories to rationalizing order procedures at the shops.

"We took an intellectual approach to the problem," says Burgess, "as opposed to viewing it by compartments, as the Soviets had done."

The big accounting firms are now a global force, reaching into areas of business that would have been alien territory just a decade ago. Today, you could well find one of the so-called "Big Six" accountants advising not just on bread distribution in Moscow, but privatization in Argentina.

The word "accountant" is misleading because the major firms now do many other things beyond bookkeeping.



Books must still be audited, but to this traditional activity a host of more exciting ones have been added.

Since most companies are compelled by law to have an audit done, the accountants already had a sizable client list for the purpose of marketing new products. Taxation, management consultancy, insolvency work and financial advice on takeovers are now widely offered by most firms.

They have become giant financial service organizations, serving governments, multinational corporations, medium-sized companies and even individuals. KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock, one of the largest firms, recently reported revenues of US \$5.4 billion for the year to September 1990.

In the past decade, accountants have consolidated their influence through a series of mergers. Apart from KPMG, the other members of the "Big Six" are Ernst & Young, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche (DRT International), Arthur Andersen and Price Waterhouse. In the UK, Coopers and Deloitte have joined forces to form

Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte.

This combining of resources has given the big firms a huge global network which they use to distribute their services to clients. Coopers & Lybrand boasts over 700 offices in 110 countries.

Management consultancy has become good business for the accountants. It is so significant that most firms have spun it off into a separate area of activity, partly to avoid a conflict of interest when advising clients.

Andersen's Moscow bread project may have an unusual setting, but, according to Burgess, the firm is often called on to tackle similar problems elsewhere in the world. The introduction of factory technology and adequate performance measurement systems are just as relevant in Western Europe, Latin America or Asia.

Most of the consultancy arms have developed teams who specialize in certain industry areas.

Insolvency work is another burgeoning area for accountants. They have always been relatively immune to recession because audit work must still be

carried out regardless of a company's financial condition. The present economic gloom is actually adding to their workload, especially in the UK, where many companies are struggling.

The dramatic collapse last autumn of Polly Peck International, the UK fruit, electronics and leisure group, provided an intriguing insight into the working of the insolvency barons. In cases where there is considered to be an alternative to outright liquidation, administrators are appointed to run the troubled company.

Three administrators — Michael Jordan and Richard Stone of Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte and Christopher Morris of Touche Ross — were put in charge of Polly Peck. One of their tasks was to track down over \$100 million in cash and believed to lie somewhere in Turkey or northern Cyprus, where Polly Peck had extensive operations.

The accountants made a special excursion to the citrus groves of Cyprus to question fruit growers about the surplus cash. Embarrassingly, they returned to London without answers and a court injunction later barred them from access to Polly Peck's subsidiaries on the island.

Yet accountants usually get their man. By mid-December the Cypriot authorities had become more cooperative, allowing London administrators to pursue their line of investigation. Most of the cash, they reckoned, had been invested in hotels, holiday villages and other leisure developments.

In other areas, accounting firms are challenging the banks by providing companies with advice on how to run their business.

Alec D'Janoeff is director of European merger and acquisition services at Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte in London. A graduate of Eton who studied art history in Strasbourg, he is a qualified accountant who could well have turned out to be a banker. Yet, he prefers the environment at Coopers.

"Our strength is our huge client base and our network around the world," he says. "This enables us to compete effectively with the banks and we intend to expand our market share." Firms like Coopers, he explains, are aiming at the second tier of banks rather than the major European or Wall Street houses.

The "Big Six" were quick to take advantage of the privatization move in Eastern Europe. Some have been appointed as advisers to new governments, notably in Hungary, which has led to way in selling state assets.

Like all multinational organizations, the major accounting firms face a daunting task in managing their global operations. Keeping managers and partners abreast of technical developments is one problem; ensuring that the different national cultures sit comfortably with each other is equally tricky.

The accounting firms are not immune to the normal weaknesses that can affect fast-growing and generally successful businesses, nor are they totally shockproof.

Yet the shadow of the big firms is likely to loom larger as this decade progresses. If accountants were once ridiculed as dull, they are now envied for their challenge.

By Nigel Adam
London,
United Kingdom

The birth of bookkeeping The firms' founding fathers

Accounting may have its roots in the record keeping of the earliest civilizations, but the modern accounting firm really dates back to the independent auditor of mid 19th century England.

Later in the century, some of these accountants came to the US, where British capital was being invested, although no statutory requirement for independent audit of corporations existed yet in the US. Traces of most of the earliest firms in the US can be found in the firm names of today, although Price Waterhouse & Co. is the only one that practices under its original name.

In the US, the New York State legislature provided for the title "certified public accountant" in 1896, but the real rise in importance of the accountant in the US can be linked to the start of federal income tax in 1913 and the formation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914.



Argentina's big break

Calling in the giants

Argentina's ambitious effort to privatize many of its major state-run enterprises has enlisted the help of what sounds like a who's who list of international accounting and consulting firms. The privatization plan has drawn an army of well-trained consultants who have battled over the chance to participate in the process.

The privatization of the public telephone company, Entel, illustrates the complexity of the process and the need for so many expert hands to aid in the birth of Argentina's privatized telecommunications network.

The consulting firm Harteneck and López (Coopers & Lybrand in Argentina) determined a strategy for the transaction that led to the division of Entel's business into two geographical areas, north and south. An investment bank pinpointed potential buyers and a valuation of the stock was done by Deloitte & Touche.

Price Waterhouse advised a group formed by Telefónica Española, Citicorp and Technit, to determine the total value of Entel. The corporation led by the Spaniards later won control of Entel's southern network.

Arthur Anderson worked closely with the Stet group - which had gained control of the northern area - in the difficult task of taking possession of the company and transforming a public business into a private one.

Coopers & Lybrand's previous experience with the privatization of British Telecom was a key factor in the Argentine government's choosing of them to advise of identifying the state-run enterprise's competitive services. In the US, Coopers & Lybrand worked with American Telephone & Telegraph during the court-ordered breakup of the company and went on to serve as consultants for most of the Bell companies that assumed control of the former monopoly's empire.

Coopers & Lybrand was awarded the contract for the privatization scheme after submitting the winning bid to the government in an international bidding contest. Following the project, the company says consulting requests from foreign investors regarding Argentina - once more on the map of international business - have multiplied. Oil and agricultural companies, parts manufacturers and telecommuni-

cations companies request information most often.

Multinational firms have been major players in transforming state-run companies into private entities in other areas. In the case of Aerolineas, the paperwork was prepared directly by the government, but Arthur Andersen helped in the transfer of the company to the winning bidders Iberia and Ceilos del Sur. Arthur Andersen also was pivotal in improving the airline's entire managerial and planning systems.

With the experience they had gained through their participation in other privatization projects, the consulting firm was able to lend support to Cellos del Sur, participate in the bid-

ding and, once the bid was won, take control of the company and assist in organizing a more profitable business. The entire project took an estimated 15,000 man-hours in consulting time.

Arthur Andersen is also looking for alternatives to improve the financial situation of the Instituto Nacional de Reaseguros (National Institute of Reinsurance), and they are drafting a plan for the deregulation and privatization of the insurance industry. They are also preparing a diagnosis of the social security and retirement systems, contemplating the creation of private retirement funds, analyzing the income and expenditure of the Buenos Aires city hall and studying the possibility of restructuring the Banco Nación (National Bank) and the Banco Hipotecario Nacional (National Mortgage Bank).

Price Waterhouse has helped the government of Corrientes province prepare the paperwork for updating and leasing water and electric energy services.

As all this activity indicates, multinational accounting firms have been, and still are, playing a vital role in Argentina's bold privatization plans.

By Fernando Flores

In Buenos Aires,
Argentina

China's new "open book" policy

It doesn't matter where you're from, what line of business you're in, or who you deal with, paying for the same service twice is bad business. Especially when that service is auditing and especially when the two audits are done according to different standards. Unfortunately, that's what many joint ventures in China have had to put up with due to the Chinese

government's restrictions on foreign accounting firms.

But that may be changing soon when China's first joint venture accounting firm - KPMG-Peat Marwick and the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) - is up and running. Once all the paperwork is done, a KPMG will be the only foreign firm with the right to audit accounting statements and verify the re-

ceipts of Sino-foreign joint ventures and cooperative enterprises in China.

Up until now, China's law permitted only domestic public accounting offices to perform these responsibilities. Corporations operating joint ventures in China do not acknowledge auditing and capital-verification reports signed by Chinese certified accountants. Instead, they have to pay large international accounting firms for such reports — paying twice for the same service.

The Chinese side regards the joint accounting firm as an opportunity to learn Western auditing and accounting principles and procedures. Since an agreement of intent was signed by both sides on June 5, 1990, other international accounting firms have made inquiries to the Chinese ministry of finance for the same opportunity to form similar joint ventures. The ministry, however, is not expected to approve other overseas offers until it sees how this experiment goes, according to Zhang Deming, CICPA's person in charge of the joint venture's preparatory group, deputy director of the ministry's accounting affairs administration and secretary general of CICPA.

The joint venture is to be called *China Western Chinese and KPMG China* in English. Even though the joint venture has yet to be formally launched, KPMG's Beijing headquarters has already moved to its new offices in the latest hotel in the city building in Beijing. The joint venture plans to employ more Chinese accountants who have college degrees

and know English or another major foreign language. The accountants will receive on-the-job training and KPMG will assign its accountants from Hong Kong and Singapore to handle big deals.

According to the agreement of intent, the accounting firm adopts the working procedures and systems of KPMG, provided that they do not violate relevant Chinese laws and regulations. Says Johnny Chen, KPMS's chief in Beijing:

"There are some gaps between Chinese and Western accounting systems, but differences can be resolved through consultations." Chen points out that accounting regulations adopted by the Chinese government for joint ventures have assimilated many Western principles.

Looking forward to future business, Chen says his firm will only audit for joint

ventures but also serve Chinese state-owned enterprises intending to issue bonds or expand overseas and train Chinese company men who are going to do business abroad but have little knowledge of Western accounting.

Certified public accountants' offices gradually disappeared after New China was founded in 1949. With the implementation of the "open-door" policy in 1979, however, foreign companies started to enter China seeking joint ventures with Chinese enterprises.

In 1981, a few certified public accountants' offices were established and since then the number has increased to 381; employing 5,500 accountants, according to Zhang.

These accounting offices mainly audit joint ventures. It is only in recent years that they have begun to examine accounting records of domestic enterprises. Their services, however,

are usually a supplement to the job done by local government's taxation, auditing and business administration organs.

"Our services are not understood or appreciated by domestic enterprises," says Li Peirong, a manager at Beijing Certified Public Accountants Office (BCPAO). "The common grudge is: 'Why should we pay accountants to look through our accounting documents and question us when there is a problem?'"

BCPAO, one of the largest public accounting offices in China, divides its services almost equally between joint ventures and domestic enterprises, but its major income is from the former. BCPAO, which employs 53 accountants, serves 756 joint ventures in Beijing — 80 percent of the city's total.

While confirming that China's public accountants have done fine jobs, Zhang says "they badly need knowledge of, and training in, Western accounting systems and procedures." For one thing, the Chinese accountants have not yet adopted statistical sampling techniques used elsewhere. When auditing, for instance, they focus on parts which they presume have problems, resulting often in findings that are partial or evidence that is insufficient to support such findings.

By running the first joint-venture accounting firm, Zhang hopes Chinese accountants will quickly master professional skills so as to better serve the growing number of joint ventures in China.

By Zhao Hong
in Beijing, China



Count Schulenburg's hazardous move

Sergei Gorlov

In the course of a mere two years, from 1939 to 1941, relations between the USSR and Germany underwent a truly unique metamorphoses: at the beginning of 1939, the two countries were openly hostile to each other, official German propaganda shouted from rooftops about the Bolshevism and National Socialism being incompatible. As early as in August 1939, however, the "incompatible" regime began to draw closer together following the conclusion of the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In September, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a treaty on friendship and boundaries, and the subsequent three economic agreements (of August 19, 1939; February 11, 1940; and, finally, of January 10, 1941) seemed to have cemented the rapprochement. That proved to be only an illusion, however.

The Soviet government's refusal, in November 1940, to take part in redividing the world on German terms gave Hitler a pretext for ignoring all recent Soviet-German agreements and to prepare, all but in the open, an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, Hitler endorsed Directive No. 21 — "Barbarossa Plan."

Since early in 1940, rumours, confirmed and unconfirmed reports about Germany's preparations for a *Drang nach Osten* began to reach Moscow through diplomatic and other channels. The trickle of such information grew from month to month, and swelled out into a steady stream in the first half of 1941.

One of these warnings about the imminent German aggression came from none other than Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow — an episode unprecedented in the history of diplomacy. The Ambassador gave the tip-off to Vladimir Dekanozov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary to Germany, who was in Moscow at the time.

Second-hand information about the two ambassadors' meeting has long been available. An account of the conversation is to be found in the memoirs of Gustav Hilger, the Counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow, who wrote that the talk had been attended only by himself and Vladimir Pavlov, head of the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. According to Hilger, Schulenburg had gone to Berlin

in mid-April 1941, in order to try and convince Hitler of the danger of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. On April 28, Schulenburg had an audience with Hitler, but the conversation was a failure. It was only in parting that Hitler dropped the following remark: "Oh, and here is another thing I'd like to tell you, Count Schulenburg: I am not going to make war on Russia."

"The die is cast," Schulenburg told Hilger upon returning to Moscow on April 30. "A war with Russia has been decided upon."

The Ambassador interpreted Hitler's remark as follows: "He deliberately lied to me..."

Realizing that a war with Russia would have ruinous consequences for Germany, Hilger did his utmost to talk a cautious Schulenburg into "warning the Russians." Finally, Schulenburg made up his mind to make such a hazardous move. He invited the Soviet plenipotentiary — who also acted as Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR — to breakfast. The meeting took place on May 5, 1941. Schulenburg and Hilger, we read in the latter's memoirs, told Dekanozov straightaway that they had decided on the move on their own responsibility and without their government's knowledge. They tried in every way to bring home to their guest how serious the situation was and demanded that a contact be made with Berlin before Hitler decided to strike. As Hilger wrote in his memoirs, they even named the exact date of the attack. Nevertheless, Dekanozov "kept asking, with maddening doggedness," as Hilger put it, whether they were speaking on behalf of their government. If they were not, he said, he would be in no position to pass their statements on to the Soviet leadership.

Pondering over the motives behind the Soviet Ambassador's behaviour, Hilger wrote in his book that judging by Dekanozov's reaction to their warnings, Stalin suspected that Hitler was bluffing and, for that reason, "ignored numerous other warnings. Even the very fact that one and the same date of German attack was predicted in all of them was regarded by him as an indication of the Germans' systematic attempts to make this bluff look credible."

No documentary evidence of this conversation has been available for quite a time. Although the Soviet historian Georgi

Kumanev quoted Anastas Mikoyan's story about it, the authenticity of Hilger's account was doubted. Then, by sheer chance, as such discoveries are often made, a report on that meeting was hit upon at the Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Written by Vladimir Pavlov — head of the Central European Department of the USSR Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and a permanent interpreter of Vyacheslav Molotov, the chief of the Commissariat — the report recently appeared in full in *Vestnik*, a magazine published under the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Judging by the report, Hilger took an active part in the conversation.

Pavlov reported that Schulenburg had told Dekanozov in detail about the audience he had had with Hitler on April 28. He said that Hitler was clearly displeased with the Soviet government's signing of the neutrality and friendship treaty with Yugoslavia of April 5, 1941 (Germany attacked Yugoslavia on April 6) and by other Soviet actions in the Balkans. Schulenburg said he had tried to reassure Hitler "but didn't succeed in that 100 percent." The Ambassador had told Hitler that the "rumours about the coming war between the USSR and Germany," spread in Berlin and in Germany since January 1941, hampered his work in Moscow. Hitler had replied to it that "in view of the said actions by the Soviet government he had had to take precautions on Germany's eastern border."

Asked by Dekanozov what the sources of the rumours were, Schulenburg said "it made no difference at the moment. The rumours must be reckoned with as a fact." Even if we assume that Hilger's memory let him down and that those words were "the most explicit" warning given by the two German diplomats, this phrase was indicative enough that the clouds of war were gathering.

A question may arise here, of course: could Schulenburg know, on May 5, 1941, the exact day of Germany's attack on the USSR at all? He probably could. On April 24, 1941, Captain Norbert von Baumbach, the German Naval Attaché in Moscow, sent a telegram to Berlin that rumours about the "allegedly" coming war between Germany and the USSR were circulating in Moscow. "According to the Italian Counsellor (L. Mascia), the British Ambassador (S. Cripps) predicts that the war will break out on June 22. So, the date 'June 22' was discussed in the German Embassy already in April.

According to what Anastas Mikoyan told Soviet historian Kumanev, Schulenburg had named the date of the German attack on the USSR and added: "Hitler decided to start a war against the USSR on June 22."

Why am I divulging this information to you, you may ask. I have been brought up in Bismarckian spirit, and Bismarck always warned us against making war on Russia."

Let us now go back to the Pavlov-Dekanozov report. Hilger cut in and said "that, in his opinion, something had to be done, perhaps, to counterbalance the Soviet government's latest statements." Schulenburg added that this question "should be discussed in another meeting between the two ambassadors." There was no another meeting, however...

What happened next? The document bears no remarks or marginal notes. According to Anastas Mikoyan, Dekanozov hurried to Molotov's office after the talk with Schulenburg. On the same day, Stalin gathered the Politburo members, told them about Schulenburg's warning, and said: "Now they are trying to misinform us at the ambassadorial level."

The fact that the report makes no mention of the fatal date of June 22 can be explained as follows. Upon having a talk with his foreign counterpart, a senior diplomat usually instructs his subordinates who attended it what should be emphasized in their accounts of the talk, and what is to be omitted. For all we know, Vladimir Dekanozov, former Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Soviet Ambassador to Germany instructed Pavlov, then a young diplomat of 26, accordingly. The Ambassador already had good grounds for treading carefully.

The thing is that, as it follows from documents found in the Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR, Dekanozov kept sending from Berlin to Moscow dispatches about the German threat. He did that since November 1940 and through the months that followed. On December 7, 1940, he sent to Molotov a Russian translation of the following unsigned letter in German he had received:

"Excellency,

"Hitler is going to attack the USSR next spring. The Red Army is to be crushed by numerous massive encirclements.

"Here are the proofs of that:

"1. Most of the trucks have been sent to Poland under the pretext of gasoline shortage.

"2. Barracks are being hurriedly built in



Vladimir Dekanozov leaving the Reichskanzlei after presenting his credentials.



Count Schulenburg (centre) at the Soviet-German pact signing ceremony.

Norway large enough to accommodate most of the German troops.

"3. A secret agreement has been signed with Finland under which Finland is to mount an offensive on the USSR from the north. Small units of German troops are already in Finland.

"4. The right to transport German troops through Sweden has been wrested from the latter by force so that troops could be rushed to Finland by the moment of the attack.

"5. A new army is being formed of conscripts born in 1901-1903. Able-bodied men born in 1896-1920 are also under arms. By the spring 1941 the German army will be 10-12 million strong. Besides, the manpower reserves of the SS, SA and police, another two million strong, will be also committed to combat action.

"6. The High Command is busy working out two plans for the encirclement of the Red Army.

"a) a thrust from Lublin along the Pripet (Poland) all the way to Kiev.

"Other units will advance from Romania within the space between Jassy and

Bukovina in the direction of Terev.

"b) From Eastern Prussia along Memel, Willich, the Bezina and Dnieper line to Kiev. Southward advance, again audacious plans, aren't they? 'If these plans work,' Hitler said in his latest speech, 'the Red Army will be no more. We shall deal with it the way we did with the French: envelope it from river-beds and annihilate it.'

"From Albania an attempt will be made to cut Russia off from the Dardanelles. Hitler is going to use against you forces three times superior to yours numerically, as he did in France: 14 million Germans, plus four million Italians, Spaniards, Hungarians and Romanians, totalling 18 million. How strong should your army be, then? Twenty million at least. Twenty million by next spring. Numerical strength is a factor in an army's fighting capacity."

Dekanozov enclosed with the letter an assessment of this information by Skomyakov, the Soviet Embassy's Military Attaché, who described it as trustworthy. The document bears an inscription saying: **"Comrade Stalin, for your information, December 24, 1940. V. Molotov."**

Dekanozov sent in quite a number of such dispatches causing the displeasure of Lavrenty Beria, his former chief. In his memorandum to Stalin dated June 21, 1941 (NBI), Beria wrote: "I insist again that Dekanozov, our Ambassador to Berlin, be recalled and punished - he keeps bombarding me with misinformation about Hitler's alleged preparations for an attack on the USSR. He has reported that the attack will start tomorrow..."

Unfortunately, he proved right.

Count Schulenburg took the outbreak of the war as a personal tragedy. Back in Germany, he found himself out of work and later joined the plot to kill Hitler. The plot was as-terminated by men like Colonel Count Klaus Schenk von Stauffenberg and Julius Leber, a Social Democrat. As distinct from another group of plotters who wanted a separate peace with the US and Britain, they planned, after getting Hitler out of the way, to end hostilities against the anti-Hitler coalition, to withdraw German troops from the occupied territories, and to make peace with the USSR. Schulenburg was to have been appointed Germany's Foreign Minister. The plot failed, however. On November 10, 1944, Schulenburg was executed.

Peruvian disciples of Trotsky

continue to dream of a World Republic of Soviets

There were several reasons why I asked for a meeting with Jorge Villaran and Hernan Cuentas, leaders of the Working People's Party, the most visible of Trotskyite organizations in Peru. First, having read a significant amount of critical material about Trotskyites, I have not yet heard their refutations. Second, owing to changes in the birthplace of the socialist revolution, when many Latin American leftists feel deceived but are determined to adhere to their principles, the Trotskyites have the possibility of attracting more people to their cause. I told Villaran and Cuentas that Latin America seems to be the mecca of Trotskyism, not only because it is where Leon Trotsky was buried, but also because it is the place where his cause is continued more actively and, so to speak, in a more practical way than, say, in Europe.

Villaran and Cuentas looked nice intellectuals with a romantic character usual for Latin American leftist. They brought with them Trotskyite periodicals and pamphlets which reminded me of Stalin's book, *Problems of Leninism*, which we diligently studied in our youth.

"Indeed," we Trotskyites have never ceased our struggle in Latin America," Cuentas said, with the tacit consent of Villaran. "But it would be wrong to look for some differences between us, practical workers and theoreticians in Europe and elsewhere. We proceed from the need for world unity in the class struggle. In Peru, there is a strong movement for the reorganization of the Fourth International. We lead trade unions and some trade union federations and have penetrated the youth and women's movements under the slogans 'Down with Fujimori' (President of Peru) and 'For Government of Working People.' True, we do not have deputies. We did not take part in the last election in the belief that non-acceptance of parliamentary idiocy will only strengthen the working people's movement in Peru."

Is your organization legal? Have you any problems with the police?

The Working People's Party is a legal organization thanks to the democratic rights

wrested by the working class and the people from the ruling classes of this country.

I asked this question because Trotskyism is usually considered an extremist movement advocating revolutionary war and guerrilla struggle. In the 1960s the Trotskyites organized mass armed actions by Peruvian peasants.

We are not extremists and are guided in our actions by the slogan, "The liberation of working people is a cause of working people themselves." We pursue this slogan as a part of the struggle for a world revolution, regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat as the road to socialism. In keeping with the behests of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, a world republic of Soviets remains our ultimate goal. The building of socialism in one particular country will only reproduce a bureaucratic caste of the Stalinist type. As for the events of the 1960s tens of thousands of peasants revolted then, and we supported them. Our immediate aim in the course of permanent revolution is to achieve national liberation and deliverance from imperialism.

It is to be achieved by means of revolutionary war as well. Trotskyism seems to ally itself with Maoism in this respect.

We recognize all forms of struggle and do not have a fossilized scheme. The main thing is to determine the line of a break-up with the bourgeoisie and regroup all oppressed and exploited people accordingly. In one case we resort to a strike and in another we offer resistance to the public order forces. We can go as far as to raise barricades and take other actions. The country is in a grave crisis. Armed mass action is possible to defend the gains of the working people.

Is there a contradiction between your desire for unity and your refusal to take part in the bloc of left forces?

I happened to hear that when three Trotskyites meet, three different points of view appear. The differences between us are explained by ambitions and hegemonism. It is a far cry from reality. The deep crisis of our movement began in the

1950s, when Michael Pablo, then leader of the Fourth International, alleged that the Cold War would inevitably lead to a third world war and that Stalinist bureaucracy defended the Soviet society in its own manner, and so the transition period in it may last for centuries. It was a revision of the Marxist doctrine. If there is room for another, transition society of the bureaucratic type between capitalism and socialism, then Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky were mistaken.

Pablo's thesis proved mistaken. This was confirmed by the fall of the Berlin Wall and, I think, is confirmed today by Mr. Gorbachev's desire to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union. Pablo's thesis did much harm and split the forces united by the Fourth International.

I want to believe that the Cold War is over. However, the Trotskyites are against peaceful coexistence which, they think, is incompatible with revolutionary struggle.

It is difficult to justify peaceful coexistence at a time when we are witnessing monstrous aggression in the Middle East or when peaceful coexistence is used as a cover for a destructive attack on the Cuban revolution. Peace is a legitimate desire of the peoples, but it can be achieved only when the exploitation of man by man is abolished.

It is also claimed that Trotskyites, denying the possibility of building socialism in one country, deprive the present-day struggle for the socialist ideal of its stimulus.

We are Marxists and, therefore, our actions are determined by a concrete analysis of the existing situation. The imperialist powers will enter a new stage in the inevitable crisis. Stalinism, mortally wounded, is disintegrating. The time has come for the working people and the peoples who defended their economic rights to win political power.

Does it that the much discussed intention to build a different, genuine socialism in the USSR is unrealizable?

It is impossible to build socialism by destroying public property. Socialism and capitalism remain as incompatible as before. Lenin devised a new economic policy - and Trotsky supported it - as a retreat under the pressure of circumstances. However, they intended to defend the interests of the working people, not to restore capitalism.

Vitaly Sobolev,
our own correspondent
LIMA

Introduced by
New Times analyst
Rostislav Zolotaryov

For our contemporaries, Karl Popper is a familiar stranger. The scanty information about him found in our encyclopaedia give us practically no notion of him, although Karl Popper is one of the 20th century's leading scientists, a world-known philosopher and a thinker who has influenced in one way or another all modern schools of science. His works on political philosophy have had a tremendous impact on all ideological and political trends – from conservatism to Social Democracy, with the sole exception of Marxism, or perhaps a few other doctrines completely removed from reality. To "universal ideologies," Popper's works have remained a sealed book. Now, Popper has succeeded in disclosing the secrets of social utopias and working out a theory of a myth-free

and non-repressive society.

Popper's political concept is that of an "open society," of a liberal democratic social system. It is interesting in its logical method, argumentation, and its concentration on the pragmatic aspects of the functioning of a free society. Popper's concept includes a logical and critical analysis of social utopias, the practical principles underlying the institutions of democracy, the safeguards of the system, "restraints" and "counterweights." Popper worked out his own model of "social and political engineering" corresponding to the principles of free society.

His "free society" principles are not ideologized at all. They are universal for the very reason that they are open to constructive criticism. Open in the same way as this society itself is. Conflicts as such are characteristic of any society: a certain degree of dissatisfaction and discontent is inevitable in any society. He who promises people universal

happiness is only a myth-maker who gives rise to futile hopes.

The concept of a "free society" is based on Popper's concept of scientific logic. This field is basic to Popper. He started working in it as a young man when he attended M. Schlick's seminar which later came to be known as the Vienna Circle. Vienna is Karl Popper's native city. He is a fellow townsman of many who shared most of his views: Joseph Schumpeter, Michael Polanyi, Friedrich August von Hayek. In 1919, under the impact of the Russian and Central European revolutions, Popper, then 17, was influenced to some degree by Marxism which turned out for him to be a vaccine against such passions for the rest of his life. Upon joining the Vienna Circle, the young scientist dedicated himself to science, and at the age of Jesus at his death, he published his first major work, *The Logic of Scientific Research*. In 1937, he accepted an invitation to lecture at Christchurch University,

FROM THE
XXth
CENTURY
POLITICAL
THOUGHT

New Zealand, and after the war moved to Britain. The latter has become his second home where he lives and works to this day preparing to celebrate his 90th birthday in 1992.

Today we follow with an abbreviated version of Karl Popper's rather recent article in which he, from present-day positions, reproduces the quintessence of his interpretation of democracy as a political form of an "open society." (Courtesy of the *Country and the World* magazine, Munich, Germany, which was the first to carry it in Russian.)

Karl Popper on democracy

My theory of democracy is very simple and easy for everybody to understand. But its fundamental problem is so different from the age-old theory of democracy which everybody takes for granted that it seems that this difference has not been grasped, just because of the simplicity of the theory. It avoids high-sounding, abstract words like "rule," "freedom" and "reason." I do believe in freedom and reason, but I do not think that one can construct a simple, practical and fruitful theory in these terms. They are too abstract, and too prone to be mis-



From Plato, to Karl Marx and beyond, the fundamental problem has always been: who should rule the state? (One of my main points will be that this problem must be repaced by a totally different one.) Plato's answer was simple and naive: "the best should rule. If possible, 'the best of all,' alone. Next choice: the best few, the aristocrats. But certainly not the many, the rabble, the demos.

Karl Marx, who was not a British politician, was still dominated by the old Platonic problem which he saw as: "Who should rule? The good or the bad – the workers or the capitalists?" And even

those who rejected the state altogether, in the name of freedom, could not free themselves from the fetters of a misconceived old problem; for they called themselves anarchists – that is, opponents of all forms of rule. One can sympathise with their unsuccessful attempt to get away from the old problem "Who should rule?"

In *The Open Society and its Enemies* I suggested that an entirely new problem should be recognized as the fundamental problem of a rational political theory. The new problem, as distinct from the old "Who should rule?", can be formulated as follows: how is the state to be constituted so that bad rulers can be got rid of without bloodshed, without violence?

This, in contrast to the old question, is a thoroughly practical, almost technical, problem. And the modern so-called democracies are all good examples of practical solutions to this problem, even though they were not consciously designed with this problem in mind. For they all adopt what is the simplest solution to the new problem – that is, the principle that the government can be dismissed by a majority vote.

In theory, however, these modern democracies are still based on the old problem, and on the completely impractical ideology

that it is the people, the whole adult population, who are, or should by rights be, the real and ultimate and the only legitimate rulers. But, of course, nowhere do the people actually rule. It is governments that rule (and, unfortunately, also bureaucrats, our civil servants – or our uncivil masters, as Winston Churchill called them – whom it is difficult, if not impossible, to make accountable for their actions).

It is this practice (and not their theories) which my theory – my problem and its solution – tries to describe. And, for this reason, I think that I may call it a theory of “democracy,” even though it is emphatically not a theory of the “rule of the people,” but rather the rule of law that postulates the bloodless dismissal of the government by a majority vote.

My theory easily avoids the paradoxes and difficulties of the old theory – for instance, such problems as “What has to be done if ever the people vote to establish a dictatorship?” Of course, this is not likely to happen if the vote is free. But it has happened. And what if it does happen? Most constitutions in fact require far more than a majority vote to amend or change constitutional provisions, and thus would demand perhaps a two-thirds or even a three-quarters (“qualified”) majority for a vote against democracy. But this demand shows that they provide for such a change; and at the same time they do not conform to the principle that the (“unqualified”) majority will be the ultimate source of power – that the people, through a majority vote, are entitled to rule.

All these theoretical difficulties are avoided if one abandons the question “Who should rule?” and replaces it by the new and practical problem: how can we best avoid situations in which a bad ruler causes too much harm? When we say that the best solution known to us is a constitution that allows a majority vote to dismiss the government, then we do not say the majority vote will always be right. We do not even say that it will usually be right. We say only that this very imperfect procedure is the best so far invented. Winston Churchill once said, jokingly, that democracy is the worst form of government – with the exception of all other known forms of government.

We could base our whole theory on this, that there are only two alternatives known to us: either a dictatorship or some form of democracy. And we do not base our choice on the goodness of democracy, which may be doubtful, but solely on the evilness of a dictatorship, which is certain. Not only because the dictator is bound to make bad use of his power, but because a dictator, even if he were benevolent, would rob all others of their responsibility, and thus of their human rights and duties. This is a sufficient basis for deciding in favour of democracy – that is, a rule of law that enables us to get rid of the government. No majority, however large, ought to be qualified to abandon this rule of law.

The old theory and the belief that the rule of the people, by the people, and for the people constitutes a natural right, or a divine right, form the background of the usual argument in favour of proportional representation. For if people rule through their representatives, and by majority votes, then it is essential that the numerical distribution of opinion among the representatives mirrors as closely as possible that which prevails among those who are the real source of legitimate power: the people themselves. Everything else will be not only grossly unfair but against all the

principles of justice.

This argument collapses if the old theory is given up, so that we can look, more dispassionately, and perhaps without much prejudice, at the inescapable (and possibly unintended) practical consequences of proportional representation. And these are devastating.

First of all, proportional representation confers, even if only indirectly, a constitutional status on political parties which they would otherwise not attain. For I can no longer choose a person whom I trust to represent me: I can choose only a party. And the people who may represent the party are chosen only by the party...

In a constitution that does not provide for proportional representation, parties need not be mentioned at all. They need not be given official status. The electorate of each constituency sends its personal representative to the chamber. Whether he stands

alone, or whether he combines with some others to form a party, is left to him. It is an affair he may have to explain and defend to his electorate.

His duty is to represent the interests of all those people whom he represents to the best of his ability. These interests will in al-

most all cases be identical with those of all the citizens of the country, of the nation. These are the interests he must pursue to the best of his knowledge. He is personally responsible to persons.

This is the only duty and the only responsibility of the representative that must be recognised by the constitution...

All this is done away with if the constitution of the state incorporates proportional representation. For under proportional representation the candidate seeks election solely as the representative of a party, whatever the working of the constitution may be. If he is elected, he is elected mainly, if not solely, because he belongs to, and represents, a certain party. Thus, his main loyalty must be to his party, and to the party's ideology; not to people (except, perhaps, the leaders of the party).

It can therefore never be his duty to vote against his party. On the contrary, he is morally bound to the party as whose representative he was voted into parliament. And in the event that he can no longer square this with his conscience, it would, in my opinion, be his moral duty to resign not only from his party but from parliament, even though the country's constitution may place no such obligation upon him.

In fact, the system under which he was elected robs him of personal responsibility; it makes of him a voting machine rather than a thinking and feeling person. In my view, this is by itself a sufficient argument against proportional representation. For what we need in politics are individuals who can judge on their own and who are prepared to carry personal responsibility.

Such individuals are difficult to find under any party system, even without proportional representation – and it must be admitted that we have not yet found a way of doing without parties. But if we have to have parties, we had better not, by our constitution, add deliberately to the enslavement of our representatives to the party machine and to the party ideology by introducing proportional representation.

The immediate consequence of proportional representation is that it will tend to increase the number of parties. This, at first glance, may seem desirable: more parties means more choice,

A dictator, even if he were benevolent, would rob all others of their responsibility, and thus of their human rights

more opportunities, less rigidity, more criticism. It also means a greater distribution of influence and of power.

However, this first impression is totally mistaken. The existence of many parties means, essentially, that a coalition government becomes inevitable. It means difficulties in the formation of any new government, and in keeping a government together for any length of time.

While proportional representation is based on the idea that the influence of a party should be proportional to its voting power, a coalition government means, more often than not, that small parties can exercise a disproportionately great – and often decisive – influence, both on the formation of a government and on its resignation, and so on all its decisions. Most important of all, it means the decay of responsibility. For in a coalition government there is reduced responsibility for all the partners in the coalition.

Proportional representation – and the greater number of parties as a result thereof – may therefore have a detrimental effect on the decisive issue of how to get rid of a government by voting it out of office, for instance in a parliamentary election. The voters are led to expect that perhaps none of the parties will obtain an absolute majority. With this expectation in their minds, the people hardly vote against any of the parties. As a result, on election day none of the parties is dismissed, none is convicted. Accordingly, nobody looks on election day as a Day of Judgement; as a day when a responsible government stands to account for its deeds and omissions, for its successes and failures, and a responsible opposition criticises this record and explains what steps the government ought to have taken, and why.

The loss of 5% or 10% of votes by one or other of the parties is not seen by the voters as a verdict of “guilty.” They look at it, rather, as a temporary fluctuation in popularity. In time, the people become used to the idea that none of the political parties or their leaders can really be made accountable for their decisions which may have been forced on them by the necessity to form a coalition.

From the point of view of the new theory, election day ought to be a Day of Judgement. As Pericles of Athens said in about 430 BC, “although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it.” Of course, we may misjudge it; in fact, we often do. But if we have lived through a party’s period of power and have felt its repercussions, we have at least some qualifications for judgement.

This presupposes that the party in power and its leaders were fully responsible for what they were doing. This, in turn, presupposes a majority government. But with proportional representation, even in the case of a single party governing with an absolute majority and thrown out by a majority of disenchanting citizens, the government may not be turned out of office. It would rather look for the smallest party strong enough to go on ruling with its help.

Hence the censured leader of the larger party would still continue to lead the government – in direct opposition to the majority vote and on the basis of help received from one of the small parties

whose policies, in theory, may be far removed from “representing the will of the people.” Of course, the small party may not be strongly represented in the new government. But its power will be very great since it may topple the government at any time. All this grossly violates the idea that lies at the root of proportional representation: the idea that the influence exercised by any party must correspond to the number of votes it can muster.

In order to make a majority government probable, we need something approaching a **two-party system**, as in Britain and in the United States. Since the existence of the practice of proportional representation makes such a possibility hard to attain, I suggest that, in the interest of parliamentary responsibility, we should resist the perhaps-tempting idea that democracy demands proportional representation. Instead, we should

strive for a two-party system, or at least for an approximation to it, for such a system encourages a continual process of self-criticism by the two parties.

Such a view will, however, provoke frequently voiced objections to the two-party system that merit examination: “A two-party system represses the formation of other parties.” This is correct. But

considerable changes are apparent within the two major parties in Britain as well as in the United States. So the repression need not be a denial of flexibility.

The point is that in a two-party system the defeated party is liable to take an electoral defeat seriously. So it may look for an internal reform of its aims, which is an ideological reform. If the party is defeated twice in succession, or even three times, the search for new ideas may become frantic, which obviously is a healthy development. This is likely to happen, even if the loss of votes was not very great.

Only in this way can they be induced to be self-critical. As things stand, an inclination to self-criticism after an electoral defeat is far more pronounced in countries with a two-party system than in those where there are several parties. In practice, then, a two-party system is likely to be more flexible than a multi-party system, contrary to first impressions.

It is said: “Proportional representation gives a new party a chance to rise. Without it, the chance is much diminished. And the mere existence of a third party may greatly improve the performance of the two big parties.” This may well be the case. But what if five or six such new parties emerge? As we have seen, even one small party may wield quite disproportionate power if it is in the position to decide which of the two big parties it will join to form a coalition government.

It is also said: “A two-party system is incompatible with the idea of an open society – with the openness for new ideas, and with the idea of pluralism.” Reply: both Britain and the United States are very open to new ideas. Complete openness would, of course, be self-defeating, as would be complete freedom. Also cultural openness and political openness are two different things. And more important even than opening wider and wider the political debate may be a proper attitude towards the political Day of Judgement.

No majority, however large, ought to be qualified to abandon the rule of law



Four years ago **Vera Makhlova**, the director of the regional orphanage in the city of Ulyanovsk, was the first to organize "family orphanages," that is what we call families where parents take children from orphanages and bring them up together with their own children. In this they receive financial support from the government. Vera was amazed to learn some time later that she hadn't invented anything new. This practice of bringing up parentless children has been known for years in the rest of the world. However, this country didn't know anything about it and didn't want to know anything, since we considered our own educational system the best in the world.

Upon graduation from the medical college in Saratov, Makhlova worked as an anaesthesiologist and resuscitator and then headed an outpatient clinic for children. When in 1986 she was made the director of an orphanage, she almost immediately realized: the multi-stage structure of bringing up children, which gives no result despite giant government subsidies, should be abolished.

Vera believes that it is impossible to make the child love and cherish his home if his childhood is spent first at an orphanage for babies and little children, then at an orphanage for schoolchildren and finally at a boarding school. Such an upbringing lacks what is most important — family warmth, without which children tend to grow up to be cruel and aggressive.

However, Makhlova is sure that these children can find a family of their own. Especially if they are taken to the country, to rural families where the feeling of a "smaller homeland" comes quicker and easier. The problem now is to find parents who will agree to bring up adopted children together with their own. But the director believes that there are plenty of kind-hearted people in Ulyanovsk to go around.

Thirty-nine-year-old lawyer **Vladimir Zimonenko** is not



afraid to speak about the law, now that most people prefer to forget about it. He wants to address the public

through a new *Za i Protiv* (For and Against) magazine. Zimonenko believes that "every reader of the new publication is another vote FOR democracy and AGAINST lawlessness."

Does the country need dozens of regulations which no one wants to observe? Is it lawful for a government to remain in power when the people do not approve of its work?

These questions cannot be answered without serious legal analysis and without the knowledge of other countries' experience in this field.

One of the magazine's sections will explain what regulations we should use in the "standard situations" of our everyday life: when appealing a sentence, buying or exchanging a house, receiving a pension, etc.

Vladimir Zimonenko, a graduate of the Institute of Foreign Languages, received a second education at the All-Union Institute of Law for Correspondence Students. In 1978 he began working at justice departments. Soon he realized that in this country it is futile to wait for the bodies of justice to learn to defend our rights. It is better and safer to educate people in such a way as to discourage them from even thinking of doing wrong. This became Vladimir's credo during his work as head of a department at the magazine *Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*. And it remained his credo at the new post — that of editor of *Za i Protiv*.

The designer of our magazine's covers

Victor Brel, whose name you can see almost in every issue of our magazine, has his own favorite jokes. One of them is: "A flock of files is flying past a cottage, in which an elephant and his wife sit by the window knitting. The flock's leader flies up to the window and asks: 'Can you show me the way south?' The elephant raises his head and pointing to the left answers: 'Over there, to the left.'"


The files swiftly turn to the left and are gone. The elephant and his wife continue knitting. Another flock of files is coming and also asks the elephants: 'Can you show us the way south?' The elephant looks up, thinks a while and pointing to the right says: 'Over there.' The files are gone in a jiffy, and the wife asks: 'Hey, elephant, why did you deceive them?' And the elephant answers: 'Who needs so many files down south?' This is a strange joke, indeed, as strange as Victor himself and everything he does.

Victor does not remember his father, who was arrested in 1939. His family never heard anything more of him after his arrest. His father was Byelorussian, and his mother German. The family thought that somebody must have informed on him and he was arrested. All that remained is a photograph of Victor's father wrestling with a bear on the deck of a ship. He served in the Navy. It is a strange photograph.

Then the war began. Even before the war, Victor was sent to live with his grandmother in the village of Walheim near Dnepropetrovsk, because his mother could not provide for two children. There was a German collective farm at the place where Victor's grandmother lived. When the Nazis came they drove everybody to Germany. "We were riding on carts," Victor told us. "And we came under fire. There were fires and explosions all around us; and one man who had gone crazy because of that hell, stood eating cookies, one after another. He gave me a cookie too. But I couldn't eat: I couldn't understand how one could eat. I was scared. And then we rode on. I remember how we were going very fast through a rye field and the Germans were running through the rye — I could see only their heads over the ears of rye — and they were throwing out everything from their pockets — crosses, wristwatches, cigarette cases. We were riding through the rye and those things looked so tempting and sparkling, disappearing in the rye. I longed to pick them up, but I couldn't. My grandmother forbade me to pick up anything at all, and I was very obedient. Perhaps this explains why now I bring home anything I can lay my hands on. I can do so now."

"I am no photographer," Brel says. "Photography is watching life. And I start with analyzing things. I am more of an artist. The main thing to me is the idea, composition, like that of a painted picture. My work is something different from photography." Perhaps you could think up of a name for Victor's work if you look at the magazine's cover.

Yu. Lexin




Some say that **Eduard Sagalayev**, the new Chairman of the Soviet Journalists' Union (which is now a confederation) learnt that he would be nominated to the post ten minutes before the voting, while others claim that it happened two hours earlier. He was surprised, but it was not the first time that he had to make a hasty decision about his future.

The Moscow region radio station, a newspaper, the Komsomol Central Committee, the youth department of national TV, the *Yunost* radiostation, once again the national TV youth department, the national TV information department, the Channel 4 department — these are his former places of work.

He started working at television as a moustached provincial youth and he's leaving it as a grey-haired man.

Sagalayev is left of centre. His colleagues say that he is not so easy to deal with, and in him stubbornness surprisingly blends



Sagalayev's position be? "To me the struggle for glasnost means more than just participation in the confrontation. I prefer to be a negotiator rather than a man on the barricades."

"The party should defend me, because I am its son. I gave the Italian Communist Party all I had. I am an honest man, and not an adventurist. The party's reputation depends on my reputation." These are the words of **Mario Spallone**, a 73-year-old Italian Communist and former personal physician of Palmiro Togliatti and many other Communist Party leaders. The Spallone scandal has broken out now that



the Italian Communists are discussing the future and the new name of their party. The documents handed over to the parliamentary commission claim that Togliatti's personal physician was an informer of the Italian secret service Sifar. Spallone, who flatly denies these ac-

cusations, demands that the party leadership plainly speak out in his support. In a report on Spallone's case the newspaper *L'Unita* wonders if Sifar (and perhaps the CIA too) kept an eye on Togliatti, his moods, words and even details of his physical condition. These are serious accusations, whose proof or denial is contained in the parliamentary dossier, dealing with an abortive coup in Italy in 1964. Spallone, however, says that had Togliatti been alive, he would have defended his doctor.

Just a few weeks ago a correspondent for *Literaturnaya Gazeta* who was interviewing



KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov said to him: "I've read that in case of a coup and a return of totalitarianism, the No. 1 candidature to the post of KGB Chairman is your first deputy Bobkov." To that Kryuchkov replied: "It seems that Bobkov adheres to the correct political positions, supports perestroika and is not at all intending to occupy the post of KGB head. Let's regard your words as a signal and ask Bobkov."

Sixty-six-years-old, Russia's MP **Filipp Bobkov** was relieved of his post of KGB First Deputy Chairman and thanks to his high rank, that of General of the Army, was transferred to the group of General Inspectors of the Defence Ministry. He was replaced by 60-year-old Lieutenant General Victor Grushko, who began his career as a diplomat, worked for 20 years in the intelligence service and for the past two years headed the counterintelligence service.

At the latest CPSU congress **Filipp Bobkov** was not elected member of the Central Committee (while Victor Grushko was). **Filipp Bobkov** served in the system of State Security since 1945. When Yuri Andropov was KGB chief, he headed the 5th Department founded at that time, which engaged in the persecution of dissidents.

with an ability to meet his opponent halfway, modesty blends with the desire to attract people's attention, impulsiveness — with sober consideration, categorical opinions — with exceeding self-criticism. All these qualities make a very complicated cocktail, indeed. But perhaps one needs to have such a contradictory nature to make programs, like *The 12th floor, The View and Seven Days*.

On the latest snapshots, Eduard looks sad. Maybe this is a sign of maturity. Or maybe he realizes what is going on at television. Or perhaps, at the Journalists' Union too.

I think that it's for the first time that a journalist has been made the head of the Journalists' Union. It seems that for the first time this post is not an autonomous addition to a high party and newspaper position. The Union's structure has altered too — it is now a union of republican journalistic organizations. However, one can hardly speak about revolutionary changes in the union which approached its congress as well-nigh the most amorphous creative organization in the country. What is noteworthy, the congress did not approve the resolution criticizing the work of the leadership of the State TV and Radio Committee, which is considered a pioneer of the anti-glasnost campaign. What will



Two Politburo members in one republic



The Estonian Communist Party has split, and now apart from member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee **Enn-Arno Sillari**, who heads the Independent Estonian Communist Party, there's another member of the Politburo, **Lembit Annus**, who has become first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party/CPSU.

Estonia still has 47 thousand Communists, of whom five thousand belong to the independent party. Reports from Tallinn say that there's no great difference between the two parties' programmes. Contrary to their Lithuanian and Latvian counterparts, the Independent Estonian Communist Party is not going to break its ties with Moscow and avoids irreconcilable expressions. One of the party's resolutions says that sovereignty and independent statehood are the best guarantees of Estonia's future. However, Sillari adds, this is a rather long, multi-stage process, and so far it is necessary to support the democratic forces inside the CPSU, in the Union parliament and the Union government.

At the same time, as far as practical steps are concerned, the relations between the two Estonian parties are far from friendly. At the latest plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, one of Annus' colleagues demanded that Sillari and his team be kicked out. For his part, Enn-Arno Sillari recalls in newspaper interviews that not so long ago the new Politburo member Annus was calling for a vote of no-confidence to Gorbachev.

Sillari and Annus are of approximately the same age. Both started working in industry and made decent careers during the time of stagnation.

The process of dividing up party property may turn out to be very painful. Sillari notes that Estonia is the only Baltic republic where the so-called "black berets" have not yet demonstrated their might. It is necessary to do everything in our power to avoid provocations, he says.

How are we to understand it?

Anatoly Gorelov,
D. Sc. (Philosophy)

First the following anecdote. At a Salvador Dali show one viewer, after intently studying the exhibits from every quarter exclaims "I don't understand a damn thing!" Overhearing this remark, Salvador Dali retorts: "Of course not, when I don't understand a damn thing myself."

Most used to the classical Christian and Renaissance art are often perplexed when exposed to modern painting. Indeed, after such textbook pictures as Vasnetsov's "Warriors" and Savrasov's "The Rooks Have Come," it is hard to fathom the meaning of Soviet Avant-garde art let alone Salvador Dali. "What is this? Isn't Serov's "Girl with Peaches" quite adequate. What on earth do we need Abstractionism, Surrealism, Dadaism and sundry other ism's for?

Now and again the artist himself cannot interpret his own work, thereby vindicating the viewer's incomprehension.

However, people who declare that they will not accept modern art include, above all, a category unable or loth to view the surrounding world through wide open eyes. They continue to exist in a 19th-century world entertaining illusions as to the wonderful life that will supposedly dawn in the 20th century. Their clear-eyes perspective calls for completely understandable art. They fail to realize the cardinal changes of this 20th century. Which is why they are so sincerely astounded by the world wars, fascism, Stalinism, nuclear weapons and the ecological crisis, and sincerely wonder how this could have all happened. They must first understand what is going on, and realize that they are trapped by spiritual desolation. Only modern art can help, which refers not only to all about to note today's nightmarish realities. The artist himself must understand this, thereby to understand what he does.

Avant-garde art and human dichotomy

The Renaissance shelved the Christian dicta and lost the spiritual pivot which ensures integrity. It failed to evolve its own spiritual pivot. The dualism of the divine and the human so characteristic of Christianity intruded, triggering off the chain

reaction of disintegration. With no higher goal, the human being split to find it hard to comprehend the actual meaning of life, as each half seeks its own road.

The dichotomy is revealed above all in the rupture of man's salient features of intellect, feeling and body. The human being splits into the abstractly rational and the abstractly sensual: in the upshot a gap yawns between action and understanding — which is why both artist and subsequently viewer fail to understand the created art.

In art this tendency manifested itself in the division into separate genres, if we may call them that, which had hitherto comprised one entity. A case in point is afforded by the emergence of the abstractly sensual easel oil painting and the abstractly rational art of black and white, a development that Pavel Florensky noted. Though externally it all appeared as an urge to achieve a supremely realistic image, realism as such was now understood in its narrow empirical sense, subsequently as the artist's own individual impression, as demonstrated by the Impressionist movement.

Next man was diversely objectivized with possibly every single means of dismemberment applied in painting. Both the human and the divine were subject to destruction. Avant-garde art, whether promoting the abstractly sensual in the context of abstractionism as starting with Vasily Kandinsky or the abstractly rational from the angle of conceptualism as starting with Kazimir Malevich's Suprematism, proved revolutionary not only as concerned content, as for instance, with the Russian *Peredvizhniki* (Wanderers), but also as concerned the form. In this respect the form paradoxically enough mirrored life itself. True at a level deeper than the empirically superficial. We fail to understand avant-garde art precisely because we do not understand the extent to which we are ourselves deformed and divided.

Harmony has always been viewed as inalienable in art. However, harmony is fleeing the present fissured world and art, too, in its wake. No wonder we often hear it said that art is dead; indeed when we observe modern painting, implying not only the new trends, but also trends seeking to

mothball the art of the past and dish it up in a quasi-official packaging, we are at times prepared to agree.

Nevertheless, what we observe today is the tormenting effort to overcome the dichotomy. Contemporary synthesizing trends parallel the same urges in science and even the ecumenical movement and attempts to create a uniform religion. The individual fragments are again coming together. Avant-garde art is rising up to a new spiritual plateau. It is developing its own vocabulary, even though rarely so distinctly read as *Reich*. The goals set are so grand and original that perhaps there is some point to noting them, when discussed is their pictorial representation and trends such as post-modernism and post-avant-gardism.

The new world of life that genuine works of culture including art created also integrate science, philosophy and religion. True, avant-garde art's religious motivation is for the most part not the traditionally religious, but something new and universal with no analogue in reality. However, we must endeavour to understand what modern art invests in its religious works. Here we see a process when the idea is transported to the image: yet there may also be cases of pure vision, even dream.

Art enables us to initially comprehend phenomena which science has yet to understand, and get the human being adapt thereto. Such the value we attribute to mystical Symbolism, even though it claims more.

The art of the primitive tribes was of a ritual magical nature, insofar as it was necessary to survive. The Christian art of the Middle Ages demonstrated a supreme ideal world, wherein the human being could achieve eternal bliss. Renaissance realism recognized as the sole real world the empirical world and sought to introduce paradise on earth. Modern art of the age of the nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe declines to reflect and recognize the spiritual desolation of our life as the sole higher reality, and within it evolves new realities from its matter. It brings all hitherto existing worlds of art into conflict to produce the creative spark from which the spiritual flame may burst forth.

From primitive times art has always created a new reality besides simply mirroring the environment. It seeks to help the human race lead a decent life and to warn against imprudent decisions. True, the disillusionments experienced in the world of reality are too many to believe the road which painting suggests.

The "vision" and the "mirage" are two concepts enabling us to understand modern art. By "mirage" I have not the slightest

intention of insulting the artist. On the contrary, I merely seek to accentuate the vitality, brightness, and beauty of his impressions, in short the features imparting true value to art. When one is hard put to understand the reality of what is portrayed, one must not demand much, but merely compare it to dream or mirage. Let that be the point of departure for a brief excursion into the kingdom of modern painting.

Visions in spiritual desolation

How should one comprehend Malevich's black square on white? One may discern it as revelation and creed of Suprematism, which was what Malevich sought or without renouncing this explanation one may perceive it as a solar eclipse in the world of painting when naught is visible, neither hill nor vale. However, no eclipse is eternal. Eventually new outlines appear on the horizon and gradually float down to earth. How do they become alive and fruitful, of what elements are they composed?

One would fain note the two basic features of the creations of the "world of painting," — even though they pertain elsewhere as well. Firstly involved in the process of creation equally are both elements of the traditional classical art and elements of abstractionist and conceptual movements, as adopted to reflect the process of the division of man, nature and society. The discovery of the new full reality to which end the achievements of realism, avant-garde art and icon painting are employed represents the post-avant-garde, which draws upon the entire arsenal of pictorial means to reflect spiritual reality and furnish a peculiar colourful diary of its own spiritual evolution.

There is a certain contradiction in the circumstance that this synthesis is composed of the products of fission, insofar as no other material lies at hand. "Still, how amazingly structured is this world (which we so often vilify) in that there arise from its dirt and filth shoots that nonetheless stretch towards light." Vladimir Kazmin (1946-1987) thus comments on his own efforts.

The second specific feature is that these elements are drawn upon to create a world in which all branches and facts of culture integrate. This was impossible before, as



O. Kandaurov, *Prince St. Vladimir*

these branches and types were objectively separate: however, now they tend to merge into a uniform world culture implementing that "unique synthesis" which Pavel Florensky mentions.

Such painting is not to be fathomed at once: it calls for a definite minimum of knowledge thereby to become "an open book" for an open mind. Yet, on the other hand, synthesis must not demand great effort and spiritual intensity, as otherwise attainment of the age-old aspiration would appear as a need to tackle a primitive puzzle.

The idea may be represented by the symbols of black and white as Otari Kandaurov affords or may be pictorially encoded sound, a kind of colour music, as Vladimir Kazmin offers. Which depends on the style and manner chosen. Paramount here is that the idea serves as motivation. But we may have a totally different case when the initial vision subsequently assumes a meaningfulness as Vyacheslav Petrov-Gladkii presents. However, again the semantics dominate, which induces these artists to associate themselves with what they term Semantic realism, mystical symbolism and metarealism. The last is reaction to that grounded understanding of realism, which established itself in modern times. It is opposed to surrealism similarly as the super-conscious is opposed to the sub-conscious. One may likewise speak of an Aristotelean metaphysical art as a milestone towards universal synthesis.

Incidentally, creativity, summarizing Hermann Hesse's concepts, represents a lone flight through the Universe, which can hardly be engaged. In our schemes and rational concepts.

Osip Mandelstam once observed: "Genuine labour is Brussels lace, it having the basic upon which the pattern rests, the air and the netting." The air is there in the finest creations of the "World of Painting" group, whose pictures breathe, which means they live and help the viewer to live. Art enables the soul to live, says the psychologist Levi, hence Kazmin's paintings may be employed even for medical treatment.

"The 'Music of the Spheres' and 'The Gates of Eternity' reflect the sadness felt over the lost harmony of life, the lost integrity of man, whereas 'The Astral Journey' and 'The Inferno' symbolize the ecological

calastrophe menacing the human race — our earthly inferno as compared to the earthly paradise. We see avant-garde art mirroring our real life from an unexpected quarter. In the same manner as 'The Gates of Eternity' symbolize our striving for light, so does 'The Inferno' represent its outcome, thus recalling the wise saying: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions."

"Isis. Mother of the World" is a pictorial paean to the Entity, whereas "The Music of Light" is a paean to harmony, to truth within the frame prescribed by the revived fission. Though we may or may not accept these efforts, we must necessarily know what the artist seeks to tell us, inasmuch as according to Goethe, art is the genuine mediator.

One sponsor of the Express Avant-garde-88 Show mounted in the exhibition room of the Soviet Cultural Foundation averred that it signified official recognition of Soviet Avant-garde art. Rather was this official permission. Genuine recognition will arrive, only given the two-way process of the coming together of nation and artist, when the scales fall from the eyes of both. The era of permission should be followed by the era of understanding, when not only artists wonder when there will at last be founded a museum of modern art, exhibiting the best of both Soviet and foreign artists.

Bequeathed to the countrymen

The history of the Russian Emigrational Archive, founded in Prague in 1923 as a single collection of precious historical documents of our compatriots abroad, ended together with World War II


When Prague was liberated, nine train cars full with documents left heading in the direction of the Soviet border. Those were the materials of the Russian Historical Archive Abroad – the name given to the archive a year after its foundation. As a sign of gratitude to the liberators, the Czechoslovak government presented the archive to the USSR Academy of Sciences in connection with its 220th Anniversary.

The Soviet government, which according to some sources was the initiator of this action, did not hesitate to accept and bring to the Soviet Union the precious gift, which for more than twenty years had been gathered, saved and preserved through the efforts of people who were forced to leave Russia but who always remembered it. Their active love for their homeland and their desire to preserve documents for generations to come helped to make the archive's work very productive: correspondents of the archive gathered documents in 44 countries around the world.

However it is difficult to imagine how all that could have been financed by Russian émigrés alone. The archive could exist only due to the moral and financial support of the Czechoslovak government. The first Czechoslovak president Tomas Masaryk and Head of Government Karel Kramar did a lot for the organization of the archive, as well as for the entire "Russian action" in Czechoslovakia – an extensive programme of assistance to Russian émigrés (there was a series of Russian institutes, and numerous newspapers and magazines were published in Russian). Not so long ago the magazine *Ogonyok* carried extracts from diaries and compositions of students of Russian high schools in Czechoslovakia. One cannot read them without tears – the sufferings and grief which those little exiles had to go through did not harden their souls. Every composition contains the words of gratitude to the people who gave them shelter and

peace: "Thanks to the dear Czechs for the shelter they gave us."

The postwar fate of the archive was dramatic indeed. Instead of the Academy of Sciences, the archive wound up at the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. As a result of "work" with the documents, a card index was made, which included 18 thousand names (the data of the October Revolution Archives); the



The building housing the Russian Historical Archive Abroad in Prague

card index was actively used by the staff of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

The fate of the documents was tragic as well. After a certain "processing" they were divided among the October Revolution Archives, the Literature and Art Archives and the Soviet Army Archives, where they've been kept ever since. The materials concerning the emigration of the Cossacks were transferred to the archives in Novocherkassk. Part of these documents are said to be kept in archives in Kiev. In a word, a unique collection of documents, which could do credit to any country, was scattered among several institutions.

For some forty years only rare lucky people were allowed to see the documents from Prague, but even they could not name the source – the researchers were supposed to name only modern archives.

The archive's documents were made available to the broad public in 1988, when with the golden age of glasnost and perestroika, the October Revolution Archives were allowed to open their funds to

all interested in the lives of Russian émigrés. However even now, says Tatiana Pavlova, deputy director of the October Revolution Archives, the full history of the Prague archives has not been written. But Tatiana is working on this problem.

In the past few years, many Soviet organizations, those dealing with culture included, received the right to work independently abroad. The Soviet Culture Foundation is now engaged in gathering documents concerning Soviet émigrés. Those who would like to send their archives to Russia but don't want to have anything to do with the old bureaucratic system, including the

archives which, they believe, have discredited themselves, are granting their documents to the Foundation. To the credit of this non-governmental organization be it said that after the art objects are studied by experts and their description is completed, the Foundation holds exhibitions for the public, which do not remain unnoticed, and then turns them over to various museums of this country. As for rare books and documents dealing with Russian émigrés (one of the latest archives received was Boris Savinkov's archive granted

by his relative in Prague), the Foundation prefers to keep them hoping that with time it will form its own collection of documents and library devoted to Russian émigrés. That's a very noble idea. But how long will it take to carry this out?


Since we have realized the value of what was bequeathed to us by our forefathers not only in Russia, but also abroad, can't we afford to form a single archive of Russian émigrés, though we are in dire straits? Such an archive would be an illustration of the recognition, reunion and inseparability of the two branches of our culture and the first material link which could provide a real opportunity for the nation's spiritual revival, something we talk so much about. We cannot permit the archive to be used for narrow, selfish interests of separate organizations. The main thing is to preserve what we own by right.

Tatiana Firsova

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